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REWRITING ROE v. WADE
Donald H. Regan* t
Roe v. Wade is one of the most controversial cases the Supreme Court has decided. The result in the case - the establishment of a constitutional right to abortion - was controversial
enough. Beyond that, even people who approve of the result have
been dissatisfied with the Court's opinion. Others before me have
attempted to explain how a better opinion could have been written.' It seems to me, however, that the most promising argument
in support of the result of Roe has not yet been made. This essay
contains my suggestions for "rewriting" Roe v. Wade.2
Ultimately, my argument is an equal protection argument. I
shall suggest that abortion should be viewed as presenting a problem in what we might call "the law of samaritanism", that is, the
law concerning obligations imposed on certain individuals to give
aid to others. It is a deeply rooted principle of American law that
an individual is ordinarily not required to volunteer aid to another individual who is in danger or in need of assistance. In brief,
our law does not require people to be Good Samaritans. I shall
argue that if we require a pregnant woman to carry the fetus to
term and deliver it - if we forbid abortion, in other words

-

we

are compelling her to be a Good Samaritan. I shall argue further
that if we consider the generally very limited scope of obligations
of samaritanism under our law, and if we consider the special
nature of the burdens imposed on pregnant women by laws forbidding abortion, we must eventually conclude that the equal
protection clause forbids imposition of these burdens on pregnant
women. Some other potential samaritans whom there is better
reason to burden with duties to aid are burdened less or in less
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1963, Harvard University; LL.B.
1966, University of Virginia; B. Phil. 1968, Oxford University.-Ed.
t In writing this essay, I have been helped by numerous friends and colleagues:
Barbara Adams, Elizabeth Axelson, Vince Blasi, Cheryl Helland, Doug Kahn, Rick Lempert, Gerry Rosberg, Joe Sax, Marianne Westen, Peter Westen, and Chris Whitman. I
should also like to thank my research assistants, Lynn Helland and Brad Rutledge,
whose contribution is most inadequately reflected in the footnotes, which I have intentionally kept rather sparse.
1. E.g., Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its
Critics, 53 B.U. L. Rav. 765 (1973); Tribe, Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process
of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. Rv. 1 (1973); Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the
Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. Rav. 689
(1976).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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objectionable ways, and still other potential samaritans whose
situations are closely analogous to that of the pregnant "woman
are burdened only trivially or not at all. (I shall suggest a similar
equal protection argument, based on the notion that abortion can
be regarded as a problem in the law of self-defense, but I prefer
the samaritanism argument and I shall give it much more attention.)
The argument I have just sketched will require a fairly
lengthy development. In particular, it will require an extended
(though far from complete) discussion of the law of samaritanism.
It is worth explaining as well as I can in advance of the discussion
why such an extended discussion is necessary. I do this not to
justify my prolixity, but in hopes that the reader will be less likely
to lose the thread of the larger argument.
The basic problem is that the situation of the pregnant
woman is sui generis. If we regard the pregnant woman as a
potential samaritan, there is no other potential samaritan whose
situation is not in some important way distinguishable. This
means that it is not possible to exhibit the sort of unjustified
inconsistency of treatment that amounts to an equal protection
violation just by comparing the pregnant woman with some other
particular potential samaritan. Rather, it is necessary to survey
the entire field of samaritan law, and to argue that laws forbidding abortion subject pregnant women to treatment which is at
odds with the general spirit of samaritan law.
I have explained the necessity for a survey of samaritan law.
Unfortunately, samaritan law is complicated. The basic and wellestablished common law principle is that one individual is not
required to volunteer aid to another. But there are numerous
exceptions to this principle recognized by the common law. There
are also a number of exceptions and apparent exceptions to the
principle created by statute. Because no single case is perfectly
analogous to the case of the pregnant woman, we shall have to
discuss a wide range of cases.
The uniqueness of the abortion case also creates problems
when we get to the equal protection argument itself. I shall be
compelled to sketch an approach to equal protection questions
which justifies my rather unusual suggestion that laws forbidding
abortion should be struck down, not because they treat pregnant
women differently from the way we treat some other class of
potential samaritans who are indistinguishable, but rather because they treat pregnant women in a way which is at odds with
the general tenor of samaritan law.
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It is perhaps worth noting that my equal protection argument will not turn simply on the fact that laws forbidding abortion seem aberrant when viewed against the background of samaritan law. I regard it as important that laws forbidding abortion impair constitutionally protected interests. (The interests I
have in mind are not in "privacy" or in freedom of choice with
regard to marriage, procreation, and child-rearing, but rather in
non-subordination and in freedom from physical invasion.) I also
regard it as important that laws forbidding abortion involve a
classification which is at least somewhat suspect. These themes,
which are familiar elements of the "new equal protection", will
be developed further in Section I. The approach to equal protection I shall eventually sketch will differ somewhat from the
Court's official doctrine on equal protection. Even so, it will
represent not merely the approach I think the Court should take,
but also, generally speaking, the approach I think they are taking.
Two final introductory points, on vocabulary. First, I have
already referred to "laws forbidding abortion". Obviously there
are a great variety of laws and possible laws forbidding abortion
in at least some circumstances. What I mean by a "law forbidding
abortion" is a law of the general type that was standard in the
United States before the decision in Roe. I mean a law that forbids abortion in most circumstances, whether or not the law provides exceptions for cases involving rape, or for cases in which
there is a substantial threat of death or serious physical harm to
the pregnant woman, or whatever. Similarly, when I argue that
laws forbidding abortion are unconstitutional, I do not mean that
the state may not forbid abortion under any circumstances. I am
arguing for something along the lines of what Roe guaranteed
freedom to choose abortion in the early stages (or before the
final stage) of pregnancy. For the most part it will not be necessary to be more precise about the provisions of "laws forbidding
abortion" or about the contours of the freedom for the woman
I am defending. The second point on vocabulary is simply that
for convenience I shall use the word "fetus" to refer to the
conceptus at every stage of its development.

I. THE PREGNANT WoMAN As SAMARITAN
In this Section of the essay, I shall attempt to locate the
abortion problem in the doctrinal landscape of samaritan law.
Some readers will object that the abortion problem does not
belong in that landscape at all, that I am looking at the wrong
map. We usually think of samaritan problems as problems
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involving omissions. The established general principle that one
does not have to volunteer aid (which I shall refer to as the
"bad-samaritan principle") is normally thought of as equivalent
to the notion that there is no liability for a failure to act. But the
behavior of a woman who secures an abortion does not look like
an omission. It looks like an act. So does the behavior of anyone who helps her. Perhaps the bad-samaritan principle is irrelevant. The first project for this part of the essay, then, is to
explain why the abortion problem should be regarded as a problem in samaritan law.
Once we have established that we are looking at the right
map, we shall attempt to orient ourselves with regard to some
important landmarks, such as the established exceptions and
apparent exceptions to the bad-samaritan principle. Two important propositions will appear. First, the abortion case is distinguishable in some significant respects from every other case in
which a duty to aid is imposed. A respectable argument can
therefore be made that if the pregnant woman is to be treated
consistently with other potential samaritans, it is impermissible
to impose on her even a trivially burdensome duty to aid. Many
readers will not be persuaded by such an argument, however.
They will believe that even if the pregnant woman is distinguishable from every other potential samaritan on whom duties to aid
are imposed, still the cumulative force of the similarities of the
abortion case to various other cases where duties are imposed
makes it clear that the pregnant woman may be subjected to
some burdens. That brings us to the second proposition: There
is no other potential samaritan on whom burdens are imposed
which are as extensive and as physically invasive as the burdens
of pregnancy and childbirth. Even if the pregnant woman should
be regarded as "eligible for compulsion to samaritanism" to some
extent, she is by no means the most eligible member of the family
of potential samaritans. It is not acceptable to subject her to
specially extensive and specially invasive burdens, as laws forbidding abortion do.
By now every reader who has given any rein at all to his
imagination will have thought up at least two or three objections
to the claim that laws forbidding abortion are inconsistent with
the general tenor of samaritan law. There are many possible
objections to be dealt with, and I cannot deal with them all at
once. In order that the reader shall not be distracted by impatience to know when I will deal with his particular objections, let
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me indicate the order of treatment of the major topics in what
follows. First, I shall explain why abortion is a samaritanism
problem. Second, I shall examine the extent and nature of the
burdens imposed on women by anti-abortion statutes. I shall concentrate on the physical and psychological burdens of pregnancy
and childbirth, and I shall explain why I think these burdens are
more important to the constitutionalargument concerning abortion than the burdens of child-rearing or the psychological cost
of giving up a child for adoption. (It is worth mentioning now that
one of the reasons laws forbidding abortion are not validated by
analogy to the "parenthood exception" to the bad-samaritan
principle is that the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth are
physically invasive in a way the burdens imposed on parents are
not. As I shall show, physical invasions are specially disfavored
by our common and constitutional law. I think this is not the only
distinction between the pregnant woman and the parent, but it
may well be the most important distinction for my purposes.)
Third, I shall explain why the pregnant woman is different from
every other potential samaritan on whom common-law duties to
aid are imposed, including the parent, the social host, the innocent or negligent creator of a dangerous situation, the samaritan
who voluntarily begins to give aid and may be forbidden to terminate the aid, and so on. In the process I shall explain why it is
not an adequate defense of laws against abortion that pregnancy
is "voluntary". Fourth, I shall distinguish the abortion case from
certain exceptions and apparent exceptions to the bad-samaritan
principle created by statute, notably the military draft. (The
draft involves burdens closely comparable to the burdens of pregnancy, but the draft, I shall argue, is not a problem in samaritan
law, however much it may seem so at first.) Finally, a few summary remarks will conclude this part of the essay.
A. Is Samaritan Law Relevant?
The bad-samaritan principle depends on a distinction between acts and omissions. It would exempt from all liability a
physically healthy adult who watched an unrelated child drown
in a foot of water, maliciously refusing to pull the child out. It
would not, however, permit the adult to hold the child under the
water. One might argue that the pregnant woman does not even
come within the general scope of the bad-samaritan principle
because aborting a fetus, or securing an abortion, is not an omission but a positive act, like holding the child under.
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It is clear that from one perspective securing an abortion
looks like a positive act. It should also be clear that from another
perspective it does not. Carrying a fetus and giving birth are
burdensome, disruptive, uncomfortable, and usually to some
extent painful activities. In effect, the fetus makes continuing demands for aid on the woman who carries it. The fetus is not like
a child being held under water, whose prospects would be satisfactory if the adult holding it under would merely go away. The
fetus is much more like the child drowning on its own, who needs
the adult bystander to rescue it. The principal difference between
the demands of the fetus and the "demand" the child drowning
on its own makes of an adult bystander is that the fetus's demands are much greater. If the adult bystander may refuse aid
to the drowning child, then surely the same general principle
(leaving aside the possibility of relevant exceptions to the principle, which will be discussed later) allows the pregnant woman to
refuse aid to the fetus.
The point of the bad-samaritan principle is to establish that,
as a general proposition, one does not have to give aid whenever
another requires it. One can turn one's back on another's need,
declining to subordinate one's own interests. One can choose not
to be involved. When a woman secures an abortion in order to
avoid the burdens imposed by an unwanted fetus, she is doing
just what the bad-samaritan principle, in its standard applications, is designed to allow. It may seem odd to suggest that securing an abortion is really an "omission", but if we want the "act/
omission ' 3 distinction to reflect the values underlying the badsamaritan principle, then that is how abortion ought to be
viewed.
Suppose that a fetus and the pregnant woman carrying it
were attached in such a way that the fetus could be removed
without damaging it physically. The removed fetus would eventually die unless it was placed in some other womb, but it would
come out of the original carrier's womb in just the same condition
it was in inside. If this were the way pregnancy worked, it would
be much easier to see that the general right of non-subordination
or non-involvement embodied in the bad-samaritan principle
would entitle the woman to remove the fetus at any time, unless
she had waived or forfeited the right. It would be easier to see
3. The principle is discussed by Prosser in a section entitled "Acts and Omissions".
W. PROSSEa, THE LAw OF ToRTS

§

56 (4th ed. 1971).
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that the woman who did not remove an unwanted fetus was engaged in a continuing course of charitable conduct, which general
samaritan law would permit her to terminate at any time. There
are certain situations, to be discussed below, in which one who
has started to give aid may not stop. But the general principle is
that merely giving aid does not commit one to continuing it.
Now, pregnancy does not work the way I have suggested. It
is not possible (at least at the stages of pregnancy where abortions
are commonly done, and where they are safest and most desirable
for the woman) to remove the fetus without making it inviable.
This should make no difference to the conclusion that the woman
is permitted by the bad-samaritan principle to remoxe the fetus.
One reason it might be thought to make a difference is that the
fetus which was removed without being damaged would have a
chance of survival, if another willing carrier could be found in
time, whereas the aborted fetus will certainly die. But the badsamaritan principle protects even omissions that are certain to
result in the death of the person denied aid. Unless the pregnant
woman falls within some exception to the principle, the principle
would permit her to remove the fetus without damaging it, assuming that were possible, even if it were known that the fetus
would die because no other carrier could be found. Therefore the
fact that the fetus is certain to die does not remove the woman
from the scope of the principle.
It might be suggested that removing the fetus in a way which
renders it inviable is more clearly an "act" than simply removing
the fetus without damaging it. But this does not seem right. It
may be that removing the fetus in a way which renders it inviable
is likely to be a more complicated act, or a more difficult act. But
it is no more an act. Like the mere removing, it is an act in one
sense, but it ought to be viewed as an omission, or as part of a
course of conduct amounting in overall effect to an omission,
under the bad-samaritan principle. It is the only way, in the real
world, for a pregnant woman to discontinue the burdensome
course of aid to the fetus.4
4. Another possible objection to the argument in the text runs as follows: Removingthe-fetus-without-damaging-it and removing-the-fetus-and-rendering-it-inviable differ
with respect to the actor's intention. In the latter case, but not the former, the death of
the fetus is a means to the protection of the mother. Therefore, in the latter case but not
the former the removal of the fetus is impermissible. This is the Doctrine of Double Effect.
A great deal has been written about the Doctrine, and I shall not discuss it here. I do not
think it has a place in moral reasoning, but that is beside the point. I also do not think it
is part of American law, and that is very much to the point. In many situations, appeal
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I have argued that abortion must be allowed if we are to
respect the pregnant woman's interest in being free to refuse aid,
an interest we protect for other potential samaritans. There are
two possible counter-arguments, designed to show that we do not
really value the potential samaritan's freedom to refuse aid as
much as the existence of the bad-samaritan principle might suggest.
The first counter-argument involves the notion that we do
not value the potential samaritan's freedom to be uninvolved rather, we believe only that involvement should not be legally
compelled. This suggestion strikes me as somewhat odd, but it is
not incoherent. A full discussion of the suggestion would be interesting. For the present, however, it suffices to observe that this
suggestion does not constitute a reason for thinking that abortion
should be treated differently from other samaritan problems. The
pregnant woman's involvement with the fetus she carries is not
originally created by law, but if she does not desire the involvement, then, in the absence of laws forbidding abortion, she will
have no difficulty terminating it. Laws forbidding abortion
compel her continuing involvement just as much as a general law
requiring one to be a Good Samaritan would compel the reluctant
adult bystander to be involved with the drowning child.
The second counter-argument suggests that we do not really
value either the potential samaritan's freedom to be uninvolved
in every case or freedom from legally compelled involvement.
to the act/omission distinction may resemble argument based on the Doctrine of Double
Effect, but the two sorts of argument are not the same, see Foot, The Problem of Abortion
and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, in P. FooT, VIRTUES AND VICES (1978), and the latter
is not important in our law.
Anyone familiar with the literature on abortion will have assumed, correctly, that I
owe the idea of the pregnant woman as samaritan to Judith Thomson's revelatory article,
A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971). It is worth noting that
Thomson does not unequivocally claim that securing an abortion should be viewed as an
omission rather than as an act. Much of her essay seems to be based on this implicit
premise, but when she addresses the issue directly, she apparently prefers to view abortion
as an act of killing justified by principles regarding self-defense. I think a highly plausible
argument can be made along these lines, and I shall devote a brief Section II to the self.
defense argument. But I prefer to rely primarily on the bad-samaritan principle. I find it
very plausible to view securing an abortion as a refusal-to-aid, and it is clear that our law
allows refusals-to-aid for less weighty reasons than it requires for killing, even in selfdefense. (In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that the reasons which may support an
abortion are not weighty. They are.) One reason Thomson may have had for preferring
the self-defense line does not concern me. For purposes of moral argument, which she was
engaged in, it is much less clear that we accept the bad-samaritan principle than that we
recognize a right of self-defense. But there is no doubt that the bad-samaritan principle
is a principle of American law.
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Instead, it is suggested, the bad-samaritan principle is a response
to various difficulties in formulating legal rules requiring aid. In
many situations where a person is in need of aid, there will be
more than one potential samaritan. Each potential samaritan
will be in a position to ask, "Why should I be the one to give aid?"
Similarly, in many situations involving potential samaritans, it
will be unclear just how much the samaritan ought to be required
to do in the way of attempting a rescue, or whatever. Frequently,
also, it will be difficult to establish a clear causal connection
between the failure to give aid and the harm to the person who
needed aid. It may seem that the bad-samaritan principle is a
sort of per se rule designed to avoid all these difficulties by establishing a general, easily understood, and easily applied rule of
non-liability. If so, it may also seem that the abortion case should
be an exception to the per se rule. When a woman is pregnant and
the fetus is in need of her continuing aid, there is no doubt who
must provide the aid; there is no doubt what aid is required; and
there will be no difficulty in identifying the woman's refusal of
aid, if she has an abortion, as the cause of the harm to the fetus.
One answer to this argument is that even if the badsamaritan principle were a per se rule of the sort described, it
would not be clear that abortion cases should constitute an exception. There is no question about whose aid is required in the
abortion case, and there is no question that a refusal of aid will
be the cause of harm to the fetus. Nor is there doubt about what
aid is required if the fetus is to survive. But the difficulty about
the magnitude of aid which inclines us to a per se rule is not
primarily the difficulty of deciding how much aid is required. It
is the difficulty of deciding how much may justly be required of
the potential samaritan. If we did not think there were limits to
the aid that could justly be required, we could solve the "how
much aid" difficulty by requiring the potential samaritan to do
everything in his power that might conceivably be useful. As I
shall show in the next Section, the burdens of pregnancy and
childbirth are considerable, and they are burdens of a sort disfavored by our legal tradition. They are also far greater than the
burdens imposed under exceptions to the bad-samaritan principle on any other potential samaritans, except (possibly) parents.
The case for making an exception of the abortion situation would
be problematic even if the per se analysis were correct and our
commitment to the bad-samaritan principle were much weaker
than the present scope of the principle suggests.
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In any event, I do not think the bad-samaritan principle is
adequately explained as a per se rule. I do not deny that some
legal rules are of this type. Nor do I deny that for someone out of
sympathy with the idea that an individual should be free to refuse
aid, this sort of per se analysis may be the most appealing justification of the bad-samaritan principle available. But it is clear to
me that if the difficulties we have mentioned were the only support for the bad-samaritan principle, the principle in its present
broad form would not be part of the common law. There are many
individual cases not involving abortion in which none of the difficulties mentioned is serious. If these difficulties were the only
basis for the bad-samaritan principle, then instead of a flat rule
we would consider the issue of samaritans' duties case by case and
develop more specific rules. The uncertainty created would be no
greater than that created by many hard-to-apply common law
rules, and the gain in clarity about what we were doing would be
considerable. The common law recognizes the bad-samaritan
principle because it does value the freedom to refuse aid, to resist
subordination even in trivial ways, to remain uninvolved. If this
freedom is important, it is as important for the pregnant woman
as for anyone else.
One final point should be mentioned in this Section. It
will seem to some readers that even if the woman's act of securing an abortion can be viewed as an omission, the same cannot
be said of the act of any doctor who assists her by performing
the abortion. I agree that the doctor looks more "active" than
the woman. That is not primarily because he performs the
abortion while the woman suffers it. Rather it is because the
doctor is not freeing himself from the fetus's demands for future
aid, as the woman is freeing herself. The question, then, is
whether the doctor is shielded from liability by arguments
establishing the woman's freedom to refuse aid.
I do not know of any authority on whether a third party may
assist a potential samaritan who needs help in refusing aid. The
reason for the lack of authority is clear. It is only in the unusual
case, like the abortion situation, that anything resembling a positive act is necessary for the samaritan to refuse aid. There is some
law on third-party intervention in the context of the right of selfdefense (or, from the point of view of the third party, the context
of defense of others). In that context, the currently dominant
view, and the view which is still gaining ground, is that third
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parties are entitled to intervene.'
For myself, I find it easy to conclude that if the woman is free
to secure an abortion, the doctor should be able to help her.
Although I find it easy to conclude this, I do not have much to
say in support of my conclusion. I do have one observation. When
abortion is forbidden by law, many women suffer severe injury or
even death from illegal or self-induced abortions. If we assume
that women should not be seeking abortions in the first place, it
is possible to ignore this large cost, saying that the women have
only themselves to blame. But it seems perverse to say that given
the general tenor of samaritan law a woman ought to be permitted to refuse aid to the fetus, and yet to say that she may not
receive assistance in this course when the assistance would avoid
much suffering and when it is voluntarily offered and privately
arranged.
B.

The Burdens Imposed By Laws ForbiddingAbortion

In this Section I shall discuss the nature and extent of the
burdens imposed on women by anti-abortion laws. First I shall
consider the extent of the physical burdens of pregnancy and
childbirth. Then I shall argue that these burdens are of a kind
that our law is ordinarily specially reluctant to impose on unwilling parties. Finally, I shall explain why these are the burdens
most relevant to the constitutional status of abortion, even
though there are other significant costs associated with or likely
to result from an unwanted pregnancy.
1.

The Physical Burdens of Pregnancy and Childbirth

It will be instructive to begin by listing what two obstetricians, writing for pregnant women and attempting not to alarm
but to reassure them, call the "minor complaints" of pregnancy.'
First, complaints involving general inconvenience or discomfort: a tendency to faintness (generally limited to the first fourteen weeks); nausea and possibly vomiting (generally limited to
the first fourteen weeks); tiredness (pronounced in the first fourteen weeks, then disappearing, to reappear near the end of preg5. See, e.g.,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 76 (1965); W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT,

§ 54 (1972); ALl MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
6. The discussion in the text is based on G. BOURNE & D. DANFORTH, PREGNANCY

CRIMINAL LAW

(rev. ed. 1975). I have not merely copied a list from that book; rather I have collected
and arranged observations scattered throughout the book. To give specific citations would,
however, pointlessly clutter these pages.
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nancy); insomnia (difficulty going to sleep caused by inability in
late pregnancy to find a comfortable position in bed, compounded
by difficulty going back to sleep when wakened by a kicking fetus
or by the need for frequent urination which accompanies pregnancy, also compounded by general disruption of the body's
internal temperature-regulation mechanism); slowed reflexes;
poor coordination; uncertainty of balance (caused by increase
and redistribution of body weight); manual clumsiness in the
morning (caused by swollen fingers and carpal-tunnel syndrome);
shortness of breath following even mild exertion; and new aversions to certain foods or smells (especially fatty or spicy foods).
More specific complaints, still involving inconvenience or
discomfort, are: tender breasts; stuffy nose; constipation; heartburn (different from nausea, and not limited to early pregnancy);
nosebleeds; edema of the feet and ankles; a metallic taste in the
mouth; special difficulty in curing any vaginitis that may occur;
increased susceptibility to and difficulty of curing urinary tract
infection; increased frequency of urination (quite apart from any
urinary infection); occasional extreme urgency of urination (as
the fetus bumps the bladder); and occasional stress incontinence
from the same source. Many pregnant women also report more
headaches than when they were not pregnant, though there is no
apparent reason for this aside from the increased psychological
stress of pregnancy.
Among complaints not merely uncomfortable but painful,
some of which can be very painful indeed, we find: backache;
costal-marginal pain (caused by the enlarged uterus pushing
against the lower ribs); abdominal "round ligament" pain; abdominal muscle pain; pelvic ache; pelvic shooting pain (as the
fetus bumps a nerve at the rim of the pelvis); foot and leg cramps;
the different pain and leg cramps associated with varicose veins;
hemorrhoids; pain and pins-and-needles in the wrist (carpaltunnel syndrome); and mastitis. Finally, as a result of the general
softening of ligaments during pregnancy, along with the extra
weight and the loss of balance, there is an increased susceptibility to sprains and to aching feet.
The pregnant woman also experiences changes in her appearance: most obviously, the pronounced change in the shape of her
body as a whole; consequent upon the change of body shape, an
awkward gait and inability to wear her normal wardrobe; increased dryness of skin (for women with dry skin initially); thin,
brittle, unmanageable hair; varicose veins (in the legs or the
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vulva, and sometimes in pelvis, abdomen, or breasts7 ); swelling

of the face; changes in pigmentation (darkening of the nipples
and areolae; sometimes darkening of larger patches of the breast;
darkening of freckles or moles; the linea nigrafrom the pubic area
to the naval; the often blotchy "butterfly mask" or chloasma);
stretch marks (which result in part from avoidable excessive
weight gain, but which are not always avoidable).
Finally, as a result of hormonal changes, the pregnant
woman is likely to be at times markedly irritable, volatile in her
moods, or subject to periods of depression. She may also experience a loss of sexual desire.
After the period of pregnancy, there is the actual delivery of
the fetus. The days when a woman had a reasonable chance of
spending twelve hours or more in sweaty agony are happily gone.
But it is still true that for many women parturition is a thoroughly unpleasant and significantly painful experience. It can
also involve a major operation, with all the added risk and discomfort that entails, if the fetus is delivered by cesarean section.
I shall say nothing of the rare and dangerous complications
of a pregnancy and delivery, except to note that in all probability
full-term pregnancy and childbirth involve greater risks of death
8
to the mother than early abortion.
Looking beyond delivery, some of the "minor complaints" of
pregnancy listed above persist for varying periods after parturition. There are also a few characteristic post-partum pains, such
as the discomfort caused by an episiotomy.
The permanent physical effects of pregnancy which are noticeable by anyone other than a doctor and which are genuinely
unavoidable appear to be few, perhaps limited to some stretch
marks, some darkening of the nipples and areolae, sometimes
varicose veins and hemorrhoids (which become more of a problem as the number of pregnancies the woman has been through
increases), and, when a cesarean is performed, the scar from that
operation. Beyond these effects, many women attribute to their
pregnancies such other permanent effects as weight gain, anemia,
constipation, skin damaged by dryness, damaged hair, sagging
breasts, weak bladder, and painful feet or back.
The truth may well be that avoiding all the avoidable permanent effects, and for that matter minimizing all the "minor com7. J. GREENHILL & E.
OBSTETRICS (1974).

FRIEDMAN,

BIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES & MODERN PRACTICE OF

8. See materials cited in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 n.44 (1973).
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plaints", requires considerable self-indulgence during pregnancy.
The woman who can rest in the afternoon, sleep two extra hours
at night, persistently oil her dry skin, give her hair extra attention, not stay on her feet for too long at a time, eat small meals
every two hours, never put off the urge to evacuate her bowels,
religiously do her post-partum exercises, and so on, will suffer less
discomfort and fewer lasting effects of pregnancy than the woman
who cannot.
The ills of pregnancy, delivery, and beyond make an impressive list. To be sure, not every pregnant woman suffers all of these
ills. Nor do those who are afflicted suffer them in equal degree or
at all times during pregnancy. But most of the complaints I have
listed are common ones. I suspect it is an unusually lucky woman
who does not put up with enough pain, discomfort and disruption
of appearance and emotional state to add up to a major burden.
(We should perhaps remember that as a society we recoil from
being a few pounds overweight, from living in a house where the
temperature is below 70 0 even though we can afford sweaters, or
from going to the dentist.)
It may seem that I must have got it wrong - that if having
a child were as bad as I suggest, no woman would ever do it
voluntarily. Alternatively, it has been suggested to me by colleagues (male) that the pain of childbirth is a "noble" pain, or
that having a child is a "transcendent experience" in which the
pain becomes a valued part of an incomparably valued whole.
These suggestions completely and shockingly miss the point. I
have no doubt that all the pain, discomfort, and annoyance of
being pregnant and giving birth are worthwhile if one wants a
child. I do not deny the existence of transcendent experiences,
and I am prepared to believe that for some women carrying and
delivering a child are just that. (I must say that I know other
women, devoted and successful mothers, who say they would
never go through pregnancy if one could get a child of one's own
any other way.) But the question is not whether pregnancy is
worthwhile, or whether it is a transcendent experience, for a
woman who wants a child. The question is how burdensome it is
for a woman who does not want a child.
The answer, clearly, is that for a woman who does not want
a child, pregnancy is very burdensome indeed. It is worth mentioning that all of the pains and discomforts listed above are
likely to be significantly aggravated when the entire pregnancy is
unwanted. It is much easier to bear up under pain and inconveni-
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ence when they serve some end one has chosen than when they

do not.
An unwanted pregnancy is vastly more burdensome than the
actions required of potential samaritans under other exceptions
to the bad-samaritan principle. Compare carrying and delivering
an unwanted child to calling a doctor for an injured social companion,9 or to warning the object of a death threat made by one's
patient in psychotherapy,' 0 or to letting a guest invited in for
dinner stay the night," and so on. Even setting aside the small
risk of serious complications or death that is associated with
pregnancy and with none of those other duties, there is no comparison at all. The one traditional exception to the bad-samaritan
principle where the burdens bear comparison to the burdens of
pregnancy is the parenthood exception. Even here, the burdens
are of a different kind. Being a mother (of a child, not a fetus)
does not alter the entire functioning of a woman's body the way
being pregnant does. I shall say more about the importance of
this point, and about other possible distinctions between the
2
pregnant woman and the parent, later on.'
2.

The Disfavored Status of Physical Impositions

In addition to imposing burdens greater than any of the recognized exceptions to the bad-samaritan principle (except possibly the parenthood exception), anti-abortion laws also impose
burdens of a kind that is especially suspect in our law. We are
traditionally very dubious about practices which involve direct
9. See Farwell v. Keaton, 396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (1976).
10. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
11. See Depue v. Flatau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907).
12. There is some tension for the proponent of "women's rights" between the argument I am making here, emphasizing the burdens of pregnancy, and an argument made
about cases like Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), emphasizing
the pregnant woman's ability to continue at her normal occupation almost to the point of
delivery. The conflict is more apparent than real. First, there is an important difference
between asking how great a burden we can impose on the woman for the benefit of the
fetus and asking how great a burden the woman can bear while continuing at her usual
job if she chooses. Second, the variation in the actual effects of pregnancy on different
women works in the woman's favor in both cases. When considering what we can impose
on women, we must surely consider, if not the worst possible case (where what we impose,
by increasing the risk, is death), at least the worst situation to which a significant fraction
of the women affected are involuntarily assigned. In the LaFleursituation, by contrast, it
should suffice to require individual consideration of the woman's case if a significant
fraction of pregnant women can carry on as teachers with their abilities in that role
relatively unimpaired.
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invasions of the body or the imposition of physical pain or extreme physical discomfort.
The clearest example is corporal punishment. Although the
Supreme Court has never directly confronted the issue, Mr. Justice (then Judge) Blackmun wrote an opinion for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1968 that apparently condemned any use
of corporal punishment, even if specifically authorized by statute
and judicial sentence.' 3 Delaware, which was notorious in the
1960s as the only state which specifically provided for flogging,
abolished that punishment in 1972. To my mind, the most plausible explanation of the Supreme Court's surprising decision in
Ingraham v. Wright" that the eighth amendment does not apply
in schools is that the Justices did not want either to eliminate
corporal punishment in schools or to say that the eighth amendment allows corporal punishment.
More generally, decisions of both the Supreme Court and
lower courts make it clear that punishment may not be too
"physical". The Supreme Court has indicated that prisoners cannot be deliberately denied medical treatment, 5 and lower courts
have held that such disciplinary methods as "strip cells" inadequately provided with hygienic facilities constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. 6 In one specially interesting decision, a federal district court found a violation of the eighth amendment
where prisoners on death row were denied exercise facilities. 7
There is no logical contradiction in requiring that prisoners awaiting death must be allowed to exercise, or in permitting capital
punishment while we have effectively abolished corporal forms,
but there is a mild paradox that says something about our attitudes towards pain and physical suffering.
In a different area, the result in Rochin v. California" was
plainly determined by the Court's reaction to the physical brutality of the police and the invasive nature of stomach pumping.
(Stomach pumping is not quite what it sounds like. It is accomplished by the introduction of an emetic into the stomach by a
tube run through the nostrils and the esophagus. But it can be a
distressing procedure, both because of the tube and because of
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
430 U.S. 651 (1977).
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
E.g., Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123, 1130.31 (E.D. La. 1971).
342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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the forced vomiting.) Later cases have established that physical
searches - blood samples, mouth searches, rectal searches, perhaps even stomach pumping - are permissible in appropriate
cases if carried out with decorum and procedural safeguards. But
the few cases which have dealt with surgical searches (as for
bullets) seem to draw a line between searches requiring only a
superficial incision (permissible) and searches which involve
going further into the body (disallowed). 9
Other cases that demonstrate the judicial squeamishness
about physical invasion, pain, and discomfort are the cases involving so-called "organic therapies" carried'out in prisons or
other custodial institutions. Organic therapies include psychosurgery, shock treatment, and aversive therapy with emetics or paralytics. There are many problems raised by the use of such therapies aside from the physical invasion or pain they involve. There
are procedural issues about the need for medical authorization
and supervision on each particular occasion of use; there are questions about the general efficacy of such therapeutic techniques;
there are issues about the appropriateness of state-enforced
"mind control". But the physically intrusive nature of the techniques is an important factor in the generally negative judicial
reaction. One of the most persuasive opinions in the area is Judge
Ross's opinion for the Eighth Circuit in Knecht v. Gillman.1' The
opinion is persuasive not because of exceptional analysis, but
because it emphasizes that fifteen minutes to an hour of vomiting
(as the result of an injection of apomorphine) is something known
by all of us to be a "painful and debilitating experience".
In another area, a Pennsylvania court recently held that a
healthy adult could not be compelled to be the donor for a bonemarrow transplant that represented the only realistic chance for
the survival of his cousin, even though the transplant involved no
significant risk to the donor."' So far as I am aware, the case is
unique in confronting the question of compulsory organ donation,
but a number of philosophers and lawyers have recently used
compulsory organ donation as a hypothetical example of a practice clearly beyond the pale." Evidence for the correctness of this
19. Compare, e.g., Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. 1972), cert.
dismissed, 410 U.S. 975 (1973), with, e.g., State v. Haynie, 240 Ga. 866, 242 S.E.2d 713
(Ga. 1978). See generally United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (en banc) (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
20. 488 F.2d 1136 i8th Cir. 1973).
21. McFall v. Shimp (unpublished, Ct. of Comm. Pleas, Allegheny County, Pa.,
Civil Division, July 26, 1978).
22. E.g., R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 206-07 (1974); Kadish, Respect for
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view can be found in decided cases in which judges have been
very reluctant to permit organ donation by minors or incompetents, even to close relatives."
It would be interesting to see a case in which the issue was
presented of whether a parent has a duty to donate a needed
organ to his or her child. My guess is that no duty would be found.
To be sure, there are organ donations and organ donations. Donating an eye would not leave one blind, but it would significantly
impair one's sight as well as increasing the risk of blindness if
something happened to the other eye. Donating a kidney ordinarily has no effect at all so long as the other kidney remains intact.
Donating bone marrow has only temporary effects, since the bone
marrow regenerates. I would be surprised if any American court
ordered even a parent-to-child bone-marrow transplant, an imposition which (not to forget our ultimate purpose) seems more
defensible than forbidding abortion in every respect.
I do not claim that our disinclination to impose bodily invasion or physical pain overwhelms all other values. We require
immunization against certain diseases for public schoolchildren.
As noted previously, we allow physically invasive searches within
limits. We may deny heroin to an addict in custody, causing the
extreme discomfort and pain of a cold turkey withdrawal. Courts
do sometimes approve the use of organic or aversive therapies.
We are ambivalent about suicide and the "right to die", even
where life may entail considerable pain or else dependence on
highly invasive life-support machinery.
I say we are ambivalent about suicide and the right to die.
There is the Karen Quinlan case, 24 holding that an irreversibly
comatose patient has a right not to be kept alive by extraordinary
means. But there is also the possibility that that unique decision
is ahead of its time. There is the fact that abetting suicide is still
a crime, in most or all states. But the explanation is in part that
we are afraid the abettor may have exerted too much influence
on the decision. Juries are notoriously reluctant to convict in
appealing cases of abetting suicide or even of outright euthanasia
of a terminal patient unable to kill himself.
Life and Regardfor Rights in the CriminalLaw, in RESPECT FOR LIFE INMEDICINE, PHILOSO-

83, 93-94 (1977); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 918 (1978).
23. E.g., Lausier v. Pescinski, 67 Wis. 2d 4, 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975); In re

PHY, AND THE LAW

Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 1973).
24. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
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Even in the cases just mentioned, whenever a major invasion
or infliction of pain is allowed (that is, in cases involving heroin
withdrawal, aversive therapy, or the would-be suicide), there is a
significant distinction from the abortion situation. The burdens,
whatever they are, are at least arguably imposed for the subject's
own good. In a day when many people think constitutional analysis should start from the views of John Stuart Mill, this may seem
to make the impositions in question less defensible rather than
more. But one can quite rationally take the following position: No
man is his brother's keeper, and therefore the law should not
require one individual to shoulder burdens for the sole benefit of
a particular other. On the other hand, every man is assumed to
want to pursue his own interests (except perhaps where he voluntarily chooses to help another), and therefore an individual who
acts clearly contrary to his own interests, without thereby helping
anyone else, must be incompetent, in which case his choice
against his own interests need not be respected. The position I
have just outlined may be oversimplified, but I think it is a fair
sketch of the relevant part of our legal tradition.
We have wandered slightly from the main point of this
Section, which is our reluctance to invade the body or to impose
physical discomfort or pain. Let me conclude with three hypotheticals, not the ideal stuff of constitutional argument, but perhaps worth considering.
First, suppose that fetuses were freely transplantable from
womb to womb at all stages of development, and suppose that we
were confronted with a healthy, normal two-week fetus developing in the womb of a woman who was rapidly dying of some
condition that would not affect the fetus until she died in a few
days. Would we consider drafting another non-pregnant woman
to carry the fetus, choosing her by lot and implanting the fetus,
whether she wanted it or not, in her body, forbidding her to abort
it?
Second, imagine that we had a machine we could hook a
person up to which would cause the person to experience the
sensations of a difficult and painful childbirth. Imagine also a
completely innocent person who holds in his subconscious mind
a piece of information that would allow the police to thwart a
planned murder. This person is genuinely unable to recall the
relevant information, but he would recall it with the encouragement of the childbirth-simulating-torture-machine. Would we
allow a court to order that the person be hooked up to the machine involuntarily?
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Finally, consider a simple burning building, with a child
trapped inside. Would a court impose criminal liability on anyone, even the child's parent, who did not attempt to save the
child at the risk of second-degree burns over one or two percent
of his or her body?
In each of these situations, an innocent life can be saved by
a physical invasion comparable to or less than pregnancy and
delivery. In the third situation, even if the potential rescuer is
specified to be the child's parent, liability is unlikely. In all other
cases, the suggested imposition is unthinkable in the fcontext of
our legal system.
I am aware of arguments that can be made to distinguish
these hypotheticals from the abortion case. One problem with the
abortion case is that it is not exactly analogous to anything else.
My hope is merely that these hypotheticals will help the reader
to see what a striking departure abortion laws are from our usual
commitment to the bad-samaritan principle and our usual reluctance to impose physical invasions or pain.
3.

Why the Physical Burdens Are Crucial

So far I have concentrated on those interests of the pregnant
woman which are invaded by pregnancy and delivery, including
any post-partum or permanent effects of those physiological processes. The opinion in Roe and the principal scholarly defense of
that opinion2s give rather more prominence to the woman's interest in deciding how many children she will raise, and when she
will have them. It is time for me to explain my relative unconcern
with this "family-planning" interest.
To begin with, it may be doubted whether prohibiting abortion invades this "family-planning" interest at all. Ordinarily,
the woman can give up a child she bears for adoption.28 Now, even
if the woman can give her child up for adoption, that does not
mean that she can avoid post-partum injury to her interests of
every kind. She can regulate the number of children she raises,
25. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 1.
26. Because of legal restrictions or the unavailability of adoptive parents, this possibility may not always be available. For simplicity's sake, I shall write as if it were.
Obviously, when it is not, prohibiting abortion does invade the woman's family-planning
interest. Whether adoption is impossible often enough to make it clear on that ground that
women's family-planning interests are importantly affected is an issue I shall not discuss,
For reasons discussed in Section III.B. infra, the family-planning interest, even if it is
impaired, would be better exploited by a samaritan-type argument than by the "balancing" approach of Roe.
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and when she has them, but there may be significant psychological costs associated with giving a child away. There may be personal feelings of guilt over having "abandoned" the child, and
there may also be family pressure (in favor of keeping the child)
to resist and social disapproval to contend with. In effect, the
woman faces, for each child she bears, a disjunctive burden. She
must bear either the psychological costs of giving up her child or
the burdens of actually raising the child.
If we adopt a relatively straightforward "balancing" approach to the constitutional problem of abortion - if we set out
to identify the woman's interests, to identify the state's interests,
and then (somehow) to balance - we must presumably put into
the woman's side of this balance only the lesser of the two alternatives in the disjunctive burden described above (in addition, of
course, to the burdens of pregnancy and delivery already discussed). Defenders of Roe ordinarily point to the number of
women who keep and raise children they did not want, and assume that the two alternatives in question can be treated as equal
for the purposes of constitutional analysis.
My approach, however, is not a balancing approach at all. I
do not argue that the sum of the woman's interests in having an
abortion outweighs the sum of the state's interests in forbidding
it. I do rely in part on the magnitude of certain burdens imposed
on the woman, but the magnitude of the burdens is relevant not
because I want to compare those burdens to the social benefits
achieved, but because I want to compare them to the burdens
other potential samaritans are required to shoulder or allowed to
shirk. The point of my argument is that the invasion of the
woman's interests cannot be justified even on the ground that it
is necessary to save the life of the fetus, so long as other potential
samaritans more eligible for compulsion are allowed to refuse
much less burdensome and less invasive life-saving aid.
Given the nature of my argument, I cannot deal with the
disjunctive burden described above (involving either the costs of
raising the child or the costs of giving it up) by saying that the
two alternatives are about equally unattractive and the woman
is as badly treated by being subjected to the disjunctive burden
as she would be if she were straightforwardly required to keep and
raise the child. The costs involved in giving up the child do not
"count" under samaritan law in the same way that the burdens
of raising the child-would if that alternative were compelled. The
costs of giving up the child are genuine costs, but they are not
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costs of giving aid. Once the child has been born and given away,
the mother is free of duties to aid the child in any way. The
mother may be made unhappy by the thought that she has abandoned the child, or whatever, but all sorts of laws make people
unhappy without violating the bad-samaritan principle. I would
say that for purposes of samaritananalysis, the effective weight
of the lesser of the two alternatives in the disjunctive burden is
zero, and the whole post-partum burden must therefore be regarded as irrelevant. The family-planning interest drops out en271
tirely.
The reader may wonder why, if samaritan analysis makes it
impossible to consider the family-planning interests or the costs
to the woman of giving the child up, I do not abandon the samaritan analysis in favor of some approach that would. allow all the
costs to the woman to be counted. The answer - which I will
develop at greater length in Section III- is twofold. First, among
the interests of the woman that are impaired by laws forbidding
abortion, it is precisely the interests which count for purposes of
samaritan analysis that can be shown to be given special status
by the Constitution. Second, my approach, comparing the pregnant woman to other potential samaritans, avoids the necessity
for a de novo weighing of the woman's interest in having an abortion against the state's interest in forbidding it, a weighing which
I am not sure favors the woman.
Finally, the reader may be troubled by the fact that I emphasize interests of the woman which many women would not mention in explaining their desire for an abortion. Most women who
want an abortion, asked why they want an abortion, would not
begin their answer by describing the physical burdens of pregnancy and childbirth. There is a reason for this. The pregnant
woman faces at least three possible courses: abortion, bearing and
27. Despite what I say in the text, if the vast majority of women would rather raise
an unwanted child than give it up for adoption, then it could be argued that many women
have no choice. They are compelled by their psychological make-up and by social pressures to undertake the burdens of parenthood once they have borne a child. If this is the
situation, then perhaps the burdens of parenthood should count, for purposes of samaritan
analysis, as being imposed by the prohibition of abortion. This possibility may be important to some readers. My own view is that a convincing argument for the woman can be
based just on the physical burdens of pregnancy and childbirth. But for the reader who
disagrees - and in particular for the reader who ends up thinking I have not adequately
distinguished the pregnant woman from the parent or the military draftee - it may be
that a convincing argument for the woman is possible if and only if the burdens of
parenthood count as imposed by laws forbidding abortion. If they do count, there is no
doubt that the total burdens imposed by anti-abortion laws are significantly increased.
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raising the child, or bearing the child and giving it away. A full
explanation for wanting an abortion must explain why both of the
other courses are rejected. In everyday discussion, however, given
that most women want to raise children, the question "Why do
you want an abortion?" is likely to be intended as equivalent to
"Why don't you want to raise that child?" It is natural, and
appropriate, that the answer should focus on the difficulties associated with raising the child, as the answer (I assume) usually
does. If the woman were pressed with a further question, "Why
don't you bear the child and give it up for adoption?", I believe
a high percentage of women would give prominent place in their
responses to the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth I have described. I do not assert that these burdens would receive more
emphasis than the psychological costs of giving the child away.
But I am confident that, at this stage, unwillingness to suffer
substantial pain and physical invasion for an individual with
whom the woman desired no connection would be a significant
factor in many women's explanations. That, I think, is enough to
save my argument from the charge of being unrelated to what
women really care about.
C.

Exceptions to the Bad-SamaritanPrinciple

I turn now to the matter of comparing the pregnant woman
to other potential samaritans who are required to give aid under
standard exceptions to the bad-samaritan principle. It is worth
repeating something I have said before: My object is not to show
that by traditional standards the pregnant woman is indistinguishable from the totally uninvolved bystander who may refuse
even the most trivial aid. The pregnant woman is not totally
uninvolved. She is sufficiently involved that we could appropriately impose slight burdens of aid on her, if imposing slight burdens would do the fetus any good. Unfortunately, imposing slight
burdens on her will not do the fetus any good. It is very large
burdens or nothing. What I propose to show in this Section is
that even if the pregnant woman is sufficiently involved to justify
imposing some small duty of aid, she is still less "eligible for
compulsion" than any of the other potential samaritans who figure in the standard exceptions to the bad-samaritan principle.
Her situation is distinguishable, in ways that make her a less
appropriate subject for compulsion, from the situation of every
other potential samaritan on whom duties are imposed. If we
consider in addition that the duties imposed on those other sa-
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maritans are ordinarily trivial, both absolutely and in comparison
with the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth, it should become
clear why I suggest that laws forbidding abortion are out of line
with the general framework of samaritan law.
Two of the standard exceptions to the bad-samaritan principle can be disposed of quickly. One is the "statutory duty" exception. Any discussion of the bad-samaritan principle can be
expected to include the observation that there is a duty to aid if
some statute imposes such a duty. Now, statutes forbidding abortion are (on my analysis) statutes imposing a duty to aid. So it
might seem that the pregnant woman falls squarely within the
first standard exception we look at. But the statutory duty exception, considered as a general exception, is not relevant to our
purposes. The claim that there is a duty if some statute creates
such a duty assumes that the statute in question is constitutional,
whereas I am arguing precisely that anti-abortion statutes are
unconstitutional because they make an exception to the badsamaritan principle that is unacceptable given the general state
of samaritan law. It is relevant, of course, to compare antiabortion statutes, and the duty they impose, with other specific
duty-creating statutes and the duties they impose. Those other
statutes are part of the "general state of samaritan law". I shall
discuss some other statutory duties, including the draftee's duty
of military service, in Section D below.
The other standard exception to the bad-samaritan principle
that we can deal with summarily is the "contract" exception.
Duties to aid may be undertaken by contract. It might be suggested that when a woman marries, or perhaps when a woman has
sexual intercourse, she enters into an implied contract with her
husband or with the man involved to carry and deliver any conceptus that results. If there is such an implied contract, the fetus
can be regarded as a third-party beneficiary. We do not ordinarily
enforce contractual duties by criminal sanctions, but contractual
duties to aid the helpless can appropriately be so enforced in some
circumstances. The trouble with this argument, of course, is that
it is absurd to suggest that sex or marriage always carries with it
an implied promise to bear a child. Even among people who are
married, there are just too many who do not want children. " In
28. To be sure, we may say that marriage involves an implied promise to have children, meaning that unwillingness to beget or bear children is or ought to be a ground for
divorce. That is obviously quite a different matter. As to whether a husband's interest in
having a child ought, even in the absence of any contract, to entitle him to prevent his
pregnant wife from having an abortion, see Section IHL.B. infra.
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arguing against the existence of an implied contract on the basis
of what people want, I assume that we are talking about a contract implied "in fact". We sometimes imply contracts "in law"
without caring what the parties want. If that possibility is relevant at all in the present context, it is under the heading of
"status" exceptions to the bad-samaritan principle, to which I
2
now turn. 1
1.

Exceptions Based on Status or Relationship

There are a number of cases in which a duty to render aid is
based on the status of the potential samaritan, or on the relationship between the potential samaritan and the person in need of
aid. 0 A common carrier has a duty to aid a passenger; the master
of a ship has a duty to aid a member of his crew; a jailer must
aid his prisoner. Others on whom duties to aid are imposed are
innkeepers (vis-a-vis their guests), storeowners (vis-a-vis their
customers), employers of all kinds (vis-a-vis their employees),
schools (vis-&-vis their pupils), social hosts, spouses, and parents.
The situation of the pregnant woman can be distinguished
from the situations of all these other potential samaritans on
whom duties are imposed. In fact, in almost every case there is
more than one significant ground of distinction. A ground of distinction which is common to all of the cases, however, is the
degree of voluntariness of the assumption of the status or relationship on which the duty to aid is based. Every one of the
statuses or relationships I have just named is entered into voluntarily. The condition (or status, or relationship with the fetus) of
pregnancy is not chosen voluntarily by those women who, once
pregnant, want abortions. Some readers may think the distinction just suggested is more apparent than real. I do propose to
discuss it further. First, let us consider the extent to which pregnancy is voluntary.
29. The text ignores the possibility of an express contract to carry the fetus. Given
problems of proof (unless we require such a contract to be in writing), and given the
reluctance of the common law to grant specific performance of contracts for personal
services, it is not clear that even an express contract ought to be enforceable. Certainly,
however, a woman who has made an express contract to carry a fetus is a much more
appropriate subject for compulsion than one who has not. Fortunately, we need not decide
whether a woman should be allowed to bind herself by an express contract not to have an
abortion. I am prepared to restrict the argument of this essay, and my conclusions, to
women who have not made the attempt.
30. See generally RFSTATEMr (SEcoND) OF ToRTs §§ 314, 314A, 314B (1965); W.
PROSSER, supra note 3, at 340-43; W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 5, at 184.
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I think it may safely be assumed that most pregnancies of
women who want abortions are not intentional.3 ' Unintended
pregnancies may occur for a variety of reasons. Many result from
contraceptive failure. (If contraceptive methods of very high
effectiveness, say 98%, were used carefully and consistently, there
would be hundreds of thousands of pregnancies a year caused
by contraceptive failure in a large population such as that of the
United States.) Many more, probably, result from inept or inattentive use of contraceptives, or from occasional non-use. And
many result from persistent non-use, caused by ignorance, laziness, the expense or disruptiveness of many contraceptive methods, pressure from male partners not to use contraception, and a
variety of other possible psychological causes. In none of these
cases has the woman who becomes pregnant chosen to be pregnant.
It might be argued, of course, that in every case where a
woman becomes pregnant (except the case of rape), she has voluntarily done something. She has given in to pressure not to use
contraception; or she has given in to her own laziness. If she has
done neither of these things - if she is a victim of contraceptive
failure despite responsible contraceptive use, or even if she is
totally and excusably ignorant about methods of contraception she has at least had sex. Assuming she is not so ignorant as to
be unaware of the connection between intercourse and pregnancy,
can she not be said to have assumed the risk of'conception?
It is true that in every case in which a woman becomes pregnant (still excepting the case of rape), she has voluntarily had
sex. Voluntariness, however, is something that admits of degrees.
As Harry Wellington has pointed out, having sex may be more a
matter of choice than eating, but it is an act to which most of us
feel a strong compulsion.2 It is clear to me that the choice to have
31. To be sure, there will be cases where the woman becomes pregnant intentionally
and then changes her mind about having the child; but these cases will be comparatively
rare. (If the practice of amniocentesis to determine the fetus's sex, followed by abortion
of a fetus of the undesired sex, becomes more common, the case in question may not be
so rare. That does not affect what I say in the remainder of this note.) In any case which
is identifiably of this type, the case for denying the woman an abortion is very much
stronger than in the usual case of a pregnancy which is unwanted from the beginning.
Whether the case for denying an abortion is strong enough is a harder question. Some of
the relevant considerations are canvassed later on, in the discussion of duties created by
the voluntary commencement of aid, at pages 1598-1601. I think we can leave this unusual
case unresolved without impairing the general argument.
32. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 308 (1973).
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sex is ordinarily not as "voluntary" as the choice to be an innkeeper, or a storeowner, or whatever.
It might be suggested that even if an innkeeper (for example)
voluntarily chooses (in a strong sense of "voluntary") to be an
innkeeper, he does not choose to be a good samaritan to his
guests. He does not even choose that any of his guests shall ever
need his aid (beyond room and board). All he chooses is to run
the risk that some guest will have an accident or other misfortune
which requires special aid. In other words, the innkeeper does just
what the woman does when she has sex. He takes a risk. If the
innkeeper may be compelled to be a samaritan when the event
he does not want occurs, why not the woman as well?
This suggestion overlooks important differences between the
innkeeper and the woman. The innkeeper may not want to be a
good samaritan. But he actively invites the formation of the relationship on which his duty of aid is based. The innkeeper wants
guests. The woman does not want the fetus. What is true of the
innkeeper is true of every other potential samaritan mentioned at
the beginning of this Subsection (with the possible exception of
the parent, to be discussed shortly). In some cases, the relationship which is the basis for the duty of aid is a relationship of some
intimacy in which the potential samaritan chooses the particular
individual with whom the relationship is to be formed. (I have in
mind the relationship of spouse to spouse and of host to social
guest.) This obviously makes it easier to accept the imposition of
a duty to aid. Innkeepers, storekeepers, and so on, do not choose
their guests or customers with such particularity. Even so, unlike
the unwillingly pregnant woman, they actively seek the formation
of the relationship. That is the point of their calling.
The reference to the innkeeper's "calling" suggests another
observation. The innkeeper, the storekeeper, and so on, are all
engaged in providing a service for pay. They are engaged in economic enterprise. That clearly contributes to the feeling that it
is acceptable to impose duties of aid, to treat them as having
"assumed the risk"." In fact, every potential samaritan on the
list at the beginning of this Sub'section (still excepting the parent)
not only invites the formation of the relationship but either
chooses the other party to the relationship with particularity or
is engaged in an economic activity.34
33. W. PRossER, supra note 3, at 339.
34. The claim in the text might be denied with respect to jails and public schools.
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There is another respect in which all the potential samaritans discussed in this Subsection differ from the pregnant
woman. All the relationships under discussion - of innkeeper to
guest, shopkeeper to customer, parent to child, and so on - are
relationships in which the second-named party would expect aid
from the first. The potential samaritan in any of these categories
who refuses aid will disappoint expectations which are likely to
exist in fact and which we regard as reasonable. It might be suggested that the expectations exist only because of the legal duties
to aid, but I think that suggestion is simply false. Even in the
absence of legal duties, most innkeepers would aid guests who fell
ill (both for humanitarian reasons and because it would be bad
for business to refuse), most social hosts would aid their guests,
and so on. Substantial expectations of aid would exist regardless
of the legal rule, and one justification for the legal rule is that it
protects these expectations. The fetus, in contrast, has no expectations to be protected. (Lest there be any doubt, I have been
talking in this paragraph about psychological expectations, not
"legal" expectations. The claim that the fetus has no expectations is not a petitio principii. It is, I believe, an empirical fact.)
Before we move on to compare the pregnant woman to the
parent, let us summarize what we have established so far. There
is undeniably some reason to regard the pregnant woman as
"eligible for compulsion" for the benefit of the fetus. She has
(except in the case of rape) voluntarily done an act which created
the risk that her aid would be required. On the other hand, the
pregnant woman seems a notably less apt candidate for compulsion than the other potential samaritans we have considered.
Surely she should not be compelled to undertake greater burdens
than they. And yet, so long as there are laws forbidding abortion,
she is compelled to undertake much greater burdens than they.
The aid required of innkeepers and the others is trivial. It is
usually something on the order of calling a doctor or sending for
medicine. As one of my colleagues put it, we speak easily of the
innkeeper's duty to aid his guests, but we would hardly require
an innkeeper to give up a kidney for transplanting into a guest
whose kidneys had failed. That would be a duty comparable to
These cases arespecial for a different reason: the duties to aid, to the extent they are not
imposed on individuals who are providing services for pay, are imposed on the state.
Whatever value we attach to an individual's being free to refuse aid, we do not attach the
same value to the state's having a similar freedom, especially where the relevant relationship, with the prisoner or the public school pupil, is not only "invited" but coerced.
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the duty anti-abortion laws impose on the pregnant woman.
Probably the most troublesome comparison, for my argument, is the comparison between the pregnant woman and the
parent. I have explicitly excepted the parent from some of the
claims made in this Subsection about other potential samaritans whose duties are based on status or relationship. It is not
true of all parents, as it is true of all innkeepers, that they have
invited the relationship with their child. It is not true of any parents that they have chosen the particular individual with whom
to establish the parent-child relationship; and it is true of very
few parents, if any, that they have children primarily for economic reasons. In addition, the burdens of being a parent are considerably greater than the burdens of aid imposed on innkeepers
and the like. All in all, it may seem that the parallel between the
parent and the pregnant woman is very close.
There are, however, significant differences between the parent and the pregnant woman who wants an abortion, differences
which make parenthood look much more "voluntary" than unwanted pregnancy. The woman who does not want to be a parent,
or the couple who do not want to be parents, can give their child
up for adoption. There are costs associated with giving the child
up, as I have already noted. But if, as I have argued, these costs
are not enough so that the burdens of parenthood count for purposes of samaritan analysis as being imposed on women by laws
forbidding abortion, then neither are they great enough so that
the burdens of parenthood cannot be avoided by parents. 5 It is
much more plausible to view keeping the child as a voluntary
assumption of the burdens of raising the child than to view having sex as a voluntary assumption of the burdens of pregnancy
and childbirth.
We can make the same point in a slightly different way. It is
true that the law imposes burdens of care on parents. It is also
true that what we normally think of as "the burdens of parenthood" are very great. But it is not really true that the law imposes
on parents all the "burdens of parenthood". Most parents assume
most of the burdens voluntarily. They keep their child. They feed
it, and care for it, generally speaking. What the law is likely to
punish the parent for is some particular refusal of aid fairly local35. In years past, when giving the child up for adoption may have been harder to
arrange than it is today, it was probably easier to arrange some informal "farming-out"

of the child.
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ized in time. (Even where the parent's failure is a long-term
course of general neglect, the parent is arguably being punished
as much for failure to enlist other assistance on the child's behalf
as for anything else.) The parent, much more than the pregnant
woman, creates the relationship with the child. The parent who
refuses aid, much more than the pregnant woman who has an
abortion, is like the samaritan who harms the object of his
"assistance" by voluntarily embarking on a course of aid and
then terminating it after other potential samaritans have turned
their attention elsewhere, satisfied that the need is being met.
(An extended comparison of the pregnant woman with the samaritan who volunteers aid and then terminates it is reserved for the
next Subsection.)
Finally, it is worth emphasizing again that the burdens of
parenthood, however great they are, are not as physically invasive
as the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth. For better or worse,
our tradition assigns special disvalue to the imposition of pain or
extreme physical discomfort and to actual invasions of the body.
I have suggested earlier, with my compulsory-organ-donation and
burning-building hypotheticals, that we would stop far short of
imposing on parents the sort of physical burdens anti-abortion
laws impose on women. 6
2.

Voluntarily Beginning Aid

There is substantial authority for the proposition that one
who voluntarily begins to aid another assumes certain duties."
The aid must be provided in a non-negligent manner, and in some
circumstances the aid may not be terminated. It might be argued
that a pregnant woman has embarked on a course of aid to the
fetus which she may not terminate by an abortion.
The principal objection to this argument is that the pregnant
woman has not "voluntarily" begun to aid the fetus. I have already discussed the degree of voluntariness of the woman's
36. As a last word on parenthood, it is worth noting that one sort of burden is arguably
imposed on parents who are no more eligible for compulsion than unintentionally pregnant
women. I have in mind support obligations imposed on fathers who did not want a child.
I think the argument of this essay casts some doubt on the constitutionality of such
support obligations. But for the reader who thinks such obligations are obviously constitutional (and I assume most readers will fall into this category), it should suffice to note
that financial impositions of this sort are much less disfavored than the physical impositions involved in forbidding abortion.
37. REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRS §§ 323, 324 (1965); W. PROSSER, supra note 3,
at 343-48.
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choice. I have conceded that, except in the case of rape, her
connection with the fetus is not totally involuntary. But in most
cases the pregnant woman has not knowingly and intentionally
offered the fetus any assistance at all. At most she has taken a
small risk, and lost. All of the cases about "voluntarily beginning
aid" involve potential samaritans who, unlike the pregnant
woman, have knowingly and intentionally embarked on a course
of assistance to someone in need.3 8
In addition, the cases where voluntarily beginning aid has
been found to create a duty are ordinarily cases where the "aid"
in question has left the recipient worse off, as where a landlord
causes injury by performing negligently a repair he was not obligated to perform, or where a half-hearted samaritan terminates
a rescue-in-progress short of completion after other potential rescuers have disappeared, thinking that matters were under control. When a pregnancy is terminated, however, the fetus is no
worse off than it was before the only action of the woman that
could possibly be construed as the beginning of aid, namely the
sexual act as a result of which the fetus was conceived.
This "no worse off" argument may seem fanciful. I admit it
is an argument many people are likely to be uncomfortable with.
It nonetheless deserves to be taken seriously. The point is not just
that the fetus is no worse off dead than alive. 9 The point is that
the fetus which is conceived and then aborted is not made worse
off by the entire course of the woman's conduct.4 oThis is a signifi38. The discussion in the text may remind the reader of another traditional exception
to the bad-samaritan principle, involving people who negligently or innocently create
dangerous situations. That exception is the subject of the next Subsection.
39. Since the fetus does not have and has never had any conscious desire to live, I
think it can be argued plausibly that it is not worse off dead than alive. But that is not
the present point.
40. The reader who does take the argument in the text seriously may object that if
the abortion causes pain to the fetus, then the fetus is made worse off by the woman's
entire course of conduct. However, if we take account of the pain caused the fetus, we
ought to take account also of the pleasures of its earlier life in the womb (a life for which
many inhabitants of the harsher world outside reportedly pine). How we are to estimate
the balance of pain and pleasure here I do not know. Conceivably the balance would weigh
against a late saline abortion. In any event, early abortions, by whatever technique, can
hardly cause the fetus much pain.
It might also be objected that in saying the fetus is no worse off having been conceived and aborted than if it had never been conceived at all, I am overlooking the possibility that the fetus has a soul. I do not claim much knowledge about the fortunes of fetal
souls, but it seems to me that if the fetus has a soul, then it is better off (and therefore
no worse off) for being conceived and aborted and spending eternity in Limbo, than if it
had not been conceived at all.
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cant distinction between the abortion case and most cases where
a duty is founded upon a voluntary undertaking to aid.
At this point, it might be suggested that there are certain
cases where a samaritan who begins a rescue may not terminate
it, despite the fact that his whole course of conduct leaves the
person in need of rescue no worse off. The Restatement (Second)
of Torts suggests in a comment that one who has pulled a drowning man halfway to shore with a rope might not be permitted
simply to drop the rope and walk away, even if no other potential
rescuer has been discouraged." Similarly, the Restatement says
that one who has pulled another out of a trench filled with poisonous gas may not then throw him back in even though he is left
2
no worse off than before the rescue was begun.
These cases both differ significantly from the abortion situation. As to the drowning man, the Restatement only surmises that
the half-hearted samaritan may not abandon the rescue. It may
seem obvious to many readers that the rescue may not be abandoned, but if so, I suspect it is because the picture that springs
to mind is of a relatively effortless pulling-to-shore. If we imagine
instead a rescue that requires a long-sustained and painful effort,
it should seem much less clear that the samaritan who has done
no harm and displaced no other rescuer .may not quit. For the
benefit of any reader who thinks even the highly burdensome
rescue may not be terminated, it is worth noting that there is still
a significant difference between the drowning man and the fetus.
One of the reasons we would be appalled (in the case of the easy
rescue, perhaps only troubled in the case of the difficult rescue)
by the samaritan who abandoned the drowning man halfway to
shore is that the samaritan would have raised expectations in the
drowning man and then disappointed them. The fetus, as I have
observed before, has no expectations.
As to the samaritan who has pulled someone from a gas-filled
trench and may not throw him back, the point here is that once
the unfortunate is pulled from the trench, the rescue (or that part
of it) is complete. Throwing the person rescued back into the
trench is not in any sense a refusal to aid. Securing an abortion,
while it is in some respects a positive act like throwing the person
back into the trench, is the only way the pregnant woman can
deny future aid to the fetus. Indeed, it is the only way she qan
41. REsTATEMENT

(SEcoND) OF ToRTs

§ 323, comment e (1965).

42. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 324, comment g (1965).
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deny very burdensome aid which, we should note once more, she
3
never really volunteered in the first place.1
3.

Harm or Danger Caused By the Potential Samaritan

There is authority for the proposition that one who injures
another, or one who creates a situation which is dangerous to
another, has a duty to take steps to minimize the injury or danger, even if it was innocently caused.14 For example, it has been
held that when a vehicle becomes disabled in a position where it
blocks a highway, the driver of the vehicle, even though utterly
free of fault, has a duty to set out flares or otherwise warn oncoming traffic. 5
This exception to the bad-samaritan principle is distinctive.
It contemplates a duty to aid where the potential samaritan has
neither chosen to become involved with the person in need of aid
nor invited the formation of a relationship. It might be suggested
that the pregnant woman is analogous to the samaritan who innocently creates a dangerous situation. It might be suggested that
the pregnant woman has put the fetus in a dangerous situation.
Even if she is free of fault, may she not, like the driver of the
disabled vehicle, be required to give aid?
There is a significant difference between the pregnant
woman and the driver of the disabled vehicle, a difference we
have already discussed in another context. If we allow a potential
samaritan to refuse aid to someone he has harmed or endangered,
he will have made the other worse off by his entire course of
conduct. The pregnant woman who has an abortion, however,
does not make the fetus worse off by her entire course of conduct.
For all practical purposes, the abortion leaves the fetus in just the
state it was in before it was conceived. Allowing a woman to have
an abortion is therefore quite different from allowing a driver
simply to walk away from a disabled vehicle blocking a highway
on a foggy night.
43. It may seem that the "no worse off" aspect of my argument would tend to justify
neonate infanticide. That claim can be rejected for either of two reasons. First, once the
infant is born, the woman can refuse further aid with less cost to the infant simply by
giving it up for adoption. Second, we can argue that the woman has waived her right to
refuse aid sometime before the infant is born. I think a waiver argument is probably
adequate to justify the Court's holding in Roe v. Wade that third-trimester abortions may
be prohibited in most circumstances. See pages 1642-43 infra.
44. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 321, 322 (1965); W. PRossFR, supra note 3,
at 342-43.
45. E.g., Scatena v. Pittsburgh & New England Trucking, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 638, 319
N.E.2d 730 (1974).
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The reader may wonder whether the "no worse off" idea is
really as important as I suggest. It is a difference between the
abortion case and the disabled vehicle case, but is it a difference
that matters? We sometimes allow a person to escape liability
even though he clearly makes another worse off, as where,
through no fault of the driver, a vehicle goes out of control and
kills someone instantly. If the driver in such a case escapes liability even though he makes his victim worse off, can the duty to
aid in the disabled-vehicle case really be explained as simply a
duty not to make the victim worse off?
I think the "no worse off" idea is important. Where an outof-control vehicle kills someone instantly, the question of aid to
the victim does not arise, because the harm happens all at once.
Where the harm does not happen all at once, courts have apparently decided that the right to refuse involvement does not extend
to a right to refuse aid to those one has made worse off, even
innocently. To make someone worse off, or to put someone in a
position where he is likely to be made worse off, is to become
involved. The right to non-involvement can be regained only by
undoing the damage one has done.
A corollary is that the right to non-involvement ought to be
regained once the damage has been undone. Nothing in the cases
involving danger innocently caused suggests that the potential
samaritan must do more than undo the damage. If the pregnant
woman who has an abortion leaves the fetus no worse off than
before it was conceived, nothing in those cases suggests that a
pregnant woman must instead carry the fetus and thereby confer
on it a substantial net benefit.
I have discussed the duty to aid of a potential samaritan who
has innocently caused harm or danger. There is a similar, and
more firmly established, duty to aid when one has negligently
caused harm or danger. Now, I have conceded the existence of a
duty to aid even when the potential samaritan is innocent, and
it might seem that I have therefore answered the strongest possible case against my position. I have eschewed reliance on the fact
that many women who become pregnant are entirely innocent
and would clearly be excused from any duty to aid that fell only
on potential samaritans who negligently caused harm or danger.
On the other hand, it could be argued that I have made things
too easy for myself. It would not be surprising if potential samaritans who negligently caused harm or danger were subjected to
more extensive duties of aid than potential samaritans who cause
harm or danger innocently. If this were the case, and if it could
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be argued that most women who become pregnant unwillingly are
at least negligent, then I would have made things easier than they
should be. In fact, there is no evidence that greater duties are
imposed on negligent than on innocent potential samaritans.
Even if duties are imposed more consistently on the negligent, the
burdens imposed are no greater. Accordingly (returning to my
perennial final point), it is as true of the negligent potential samaritan as of the innocent potential samaritan that the duties of
aid imposed on him are completely trivial compared to the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth.
4.

Erosion of the Bad-SamaritanPrinciple

Scholars do not like the bad-samaritan principle, and they
are eager to claim that the principle is being eroded away. Perhaps it is, but if so, then the erosion is very slow indeed.
Two recent cases that might be cited as evidence of erosion
are Tarasoff v. Board of Regents46 and Farwell v. Keaton.47 In
Tarasoff, the California Supreme Court held that a psychotherapist had a duty to warn a person against whom the therapist's
patient made a death threat. In Farwell, the Michigan Supreme
Court said a teenage boy had a duty not to abandon in a parked
car a friend who was unconscious from a beating by other boys,
suffered during a night of drinking and "cruising" in search of
female companionship.
Farwellmay represent a slight extension of traditional duties
to aid, but the relationship of participants in a social "joint venture" is closely analogous to the relationship of host and guest.
Most importantly, the relationship is undertaken knowingly and
voluntarily. In addition, there is an element of reciprocity in the
relationship that is absent in most samaritan cases. This is a case
where the court might plausibly find that a bilateral contract to
give minor aid is implied "in fact".
Tarasoff appears unusual at first because the duty found by
the court runs to a party not directly involved in the relationship
that gives rise to the duty. But the case is not really very striking.
There is clear precedent for duties to third parties in cases where
the potential samaritan has a more extensive duty to control the
behavior of another - for example the duty of a jailer to prevent
the escape of his prisoners, or of an employer to control his em46. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P. 2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
47. 396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (1976).
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ployees.48 The fact that a psychotherapist does not have a fullfledged duty to control his patient should not prevent us from
recognizing, in the duty to warn, a weaker analogue. It is relevant
that the role of psychotherapist, like the role of jailer or employer,
is undertaken voluntarily and, ordinarily, for pay.
I cannot discuss every case which might be cited as evidence
that the bad-samaritan principle is disappearing. I think there is
little persuasive evidence for this proposition. In any event, even
scholars who see the rule weakening are thinking of its application to cases where the burdens on the potential samaritan are
trivial. Thus Prosser suggests that the bad-samaritan principle
may erode to the point where "the mere knowledge of serious
peril, threatening death or great bodily harm to another, which
an identified defendant might avoid with little inconvenience,
creates a sufficient relation. . . to impose a duty of action."4 ' Or
more recently, Marshall Shapo: "I have evolved as a working
principle that one has a duty to aid others in situations in which
hazardous conditions necessitate assistance for the preservation
of life and of physical integrity, and in which one possesses the
power to expend energy in that task without serious inconvenience or possibility of harm to herself."''
Whatever else may be said of the supposed duty of a woman
to carry a fetus, it is not a duty that can be discharged "with little
inconvenience" or even "without serious inconvenience or possibility of harm".
D.

Statutory Duties

A variety of statutes create duties to act for the benefit of
others and therefore create either exceptions or apparent exceptions to the bad-samaritan principle. As I have noted previously,
the truth of the general proposition that statutes may create duties to aid does not undermine my argument against laws forbidding abortion, because the general proposition presupposes that
the statutes in question are constitutional. However, since my
argument is an equal protection argument, based in part on the
claim that pregnant women are treated worse than other potential samaritans, it is important to compare laws forbidding abortion with other specific statutes or statutory schemes imposing
duties to act.
48. W. PnossER, supra note 3, at 349-50.
49. Id. at 343 (emphasis addeai).
50. M. Smio, THE DUTy TO ACT: Tor LAw, PowER, AND PuBnac POLICy 69 (1977).
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The most arresting statutorily created exception (or, as I
think, apparent exception) to the bad-samaritan principle is the
military draft. (Though the draft is not currently in force, there
is talk of reinstituting it, and its constitutionalityis not currently
doubted, which is the key fact for our purposes.) One of my principal themes has been that the burdens imposed on pregnant
women by laws forbidding abortion are significantly greater than,
and different in kind from, the burdens imposed on other potential samaritans. The only potential samaritans who are subjected
to burdens at all comparable to the burdens of pregnancy and
childbirth are parents (whom I have already discussed) and military draftees.
Now, we could attempt to distinguish laws forbidding abortion from the military draft by reference to the nature of the
burdens imposed in the two cases. We could suggest that the
burdens of pregnancy and childbirth, even if not greater than the
burdens imposed on draftees, are more constitutionally objectionable. They involve invasions of the body, and they more directly
touch on the specially sensitive area of sexual intimacy.-" This
does not seem to me a sufficient ground of distinction between
anti-abortion laws and the draft.
Draftees are likely to be subjected to a good deal of forced
exercise under unpleasant and demanding conditions. For many,
this will result in considerable discomfort and even pain. To be
sure, the draftee is not compelled to allow another person to grow
inside his body, and it might be argued that the pains of military
training make the body a more versatile and useful instrument
for varied physical activities, while pregnancy makes the
woman's body less adapted to physical activities other than
carrying a fetus. But these differences do not alter the fact that
compulsory military service involves a considerable physical invasion.
As to the suggestion that forbidding abortion touches on a
zone of special intimacy, that is true, but I am not certain the
draft is so different. The draftee is presented with a new group of
associates he has no hand in picking. He will eat with them, sleep
in close proximity to them, share bathroom facilities with them,
and spend most of his leisure time with them. Intimate associational interests of the draftee are strongly affected. Even as to sex,
51. For a suggestion along these lines, see Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. Rav. 233-, 275 n.153 (1977).
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the draftee is taken away from whatever sexual relationships or
patterns of sexual behavior he has established for himself in his
civilian life and he is thrown into a new society that is likely to
have and to enforce by considerable social pressure expectations
regarding both what he shall say about sex and what he shall do
about it. Remembering that the draftee's tour of duty normally
lasts two years while the pregnant woman's lasts nine months, I
am not persuaded that the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth
are clearly greater than, or importantly different in kind from,
the burdens of military conscription."
To my mind, the crucial difference between the pregnant
woman denied an abortion and the military draftee is this: The
woman is being required to aid a specific other individual (the
fetus); the draftee is not. Rightly or wrongly, our tradition distinguishes between obligations to aid particular individuals and obligations to promote a more broadly based public interest. (This,
incidentally, is why the draft is only an apparentexception to the
bad-samaritan principle. The bad-samaritan principle applies
only when aid to specific individuals is in issue.)
In the opinion that established the constitutionality of the
draft, the unanimous Court gave most of its attention to a federalism question - whether the power to conscript belonged to
Congress or to the states.5 The Court gave the thirteenth amendment issue, which is the relevant issue for our purposes, short
shrift. That issue is discussed explicitly only in the final paragraph of the opinion:
Finally, as we are unable to conceive upon what theory the
exaction by government from the citizen of the performance of his
supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights
and honor of the nation, as the result of a war declared by the great
representative body of the people, can be said to be the imposition
of involuntary servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that the
contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement."
If the Justices were genuinely unable to conceive how the
draft could be said to impose involuntary servitude, they were
deficient in imagination. But the point of their rebuttal is clear.
52. The text notwithstanding, a possible argument to the effect that the burdens
imposed by laws forbidding abortion are greater than the burdens imposed by the draft
was suggested in note 27 supra.
53. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
54. 245 U.S. at 390.
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It does not offend the traditions of a free people to require citizens
to perform their "supreme and noble duty of contributing to the
defense of the rights and honor of the nation". When the nation
calls and the public welfare is at stake, the citizen must respond.
In answer to the suggestion that the draftee serves a public
interest while the pregnant woman denied an abortion serves only
the interest of the fetus, it might be argued that every interest
protected by state power becomes ipso facto a public interest.
There is something to this. I am protected by law against gratuitous physical assault, and that suggests that in some sense there
must be a public interest in so protecting me. Still, the public
interest involved is ultimately based on my private interest in
physical integrity. Similarly, if the prohibition on abortion is justified on the ground that the fetus has a right to life (as it commonly is these days), then the ultimate public interest is in protecting the private interest of the fetus. This public interest is not
enough to justify compelling the pregnant woman to carry the
fetus. The reason is that in every potential samaritan case there
is a public interest in protecting the person in need of aid which
is precisely analogous to the public interest in saving the fetus.
We cannot rely on this public interest in the abortion situation
and ignore it elsewhere.
The draft appeals to a more public, or more general, public
interest - in national security. It simply does not present the
same issue as abortion. There is a difference between the idea
that an individual'is not his brother's keeper, which underlies
the bad-samaritan principle, and the idea that a citizen owes
nothing to society at large."
If the difference between the draft and laws forbidding abortion is what I have suggested, then laws forbidding abortion
might well be constitutional if they were justified on grounds
other than the right to life of the fetus. In particular, it seems that
55. It may seem that the distinction between public interest and private interest,
which I rely on in the text, is a weak reed on which to base a constitutional argument.
The idea that private property can be taken only for "public use" has arguably not been
a significant limitation on the power of eminent domain. The idea that government can
regulate only businesses "affected with a public interest" is as dead as any constitutional
doctrine can hope to be. A full-scale discussion of the public/private distinction, while
interesting, would take us far beyond a reasonable scope for this essay. Whatever the
difficulty of drawing the Une in other contexts, it seems to me there is an intuitively
arresting difference between making someone serve in the military, in defense of interests
which are plainly public if any are, and making someone carry a fetus, for the benefit of

the fetus or the child it might become.
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if there were a genuine national commitment to population
growth, abortion could be prohibited in furtherance of that commitment. This will strike some readers as a curious and unacceptable conclusion, but it is a conclusion I am prepared to accept.
We do sometimes require great sacrifices in the public interest.
The draft is the most extreme example. If it were necessary to
require women to bear children in the pursuit of a goal similar to
national security, I see no reason why that sacrifice could not be
required.
In addition to the duty of military service, there are many
other statutorily created duties to act for the benefit of others.
There are duties to fight forest fires, to work on public roads, to
submit to quarantine for infectious disease, to be a witness or a
juror. There is the lawyer's duty to serve some indigent clients
without compensation, the duty of the master of a ship to rescue
at sea, 6 the duty of children to contribute to the support or medical expenses of impoverished parents. Although this list is not
exhaustive, I believe a discussion of these representative duties
will suffice.
The first thing to say about all of these statutory duties is
that they impose burdens very much lighter than the burdens of
pregnancy and childbirth. Just as the parenthood exception to
the bad-samaritan principle is the only common law exception
which resembles laws forbidding abortion in the magnitude of the
burdens imposed, so the draft, which I have already discussed, is
the only statutory exception or apparent exception which is comparable in this respect.
Every one of these statutory duties differs from the duty to
carry a fetus (imposed by laws forbidding abortion) in other ways
as well. The duties to fight forest fires, to work on public roads,
and to submit to quarantine are, I believe, no longer of great
practical importance. Also, like the duty to be a witness or a
juror, they all involve public service - they are not duties to aid
specific other individuals, but rather duties to benefit the community at large. The duty of the lawyer to serve indigent clients
might also be regarded as a duty of public service, promoting the
public interest in seeing justice done. If this "public" interest
seems too closely tied to the private interest of the lawyer's client
(since the lawyer does work for his client in a way the witness and
the juror do not), we can also observe of both the lawyer's duty
56. 46 U.S.C. § 728 (1976).
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and the duty of the master of a ship to rescue at sea that these
duties are attached to activities ordinarily undertaken for pay.
Furthermore, the lawyer and the ship's master are required to
render services of kinds that they have shown a general willingness to render by their choice of occupation. The same cannot be
said of the unwillingly pregnant woman. With regard to the last
statutory duty, the duty of children to support impoverished parents, I have always had doubts about the constitutionality of
statutes imposing such a duty. People do not choose their parents; they do not even choose to have parents. Many states have
statutes imposing duties of filial support, but the constitutionality of such statutes has never been passed on by the Supreme
Court. 7 Even if such statutes are constitutional, they are distinguishable from laws forbidding abortion. The burdens imposed
by filial support statutes, while significant, are monetary. Also, I
assume that anyone inclined to defend filial support statutes
would rely on the claim that the child was merely repaying the
parent for benefits received, a claim which cannot be made in the
"
abortion case.
E. Final Comments
I have argued that abortion is a problem in samaritan law,
and I have compared the situation of the pregnant woman with
the situations of other potential samaritans and others (such as
draftees) who are not strictly speaking potential samaritans (because it is not other individuals who require their aid) but who
are compelled to act for the benefit of persons besides themselves.
As I have noted, the situation of the pregnant woman has no
perfect analogue. There is no other case in which noninvolvement on the part of the potential samaritan requires something that looks so much like a positive act; and there is no other
case in which the potential samaritan has contributed to the
existence of a relationship with the person in need of aid with just
the same degree of voluntariness. Expanding on the last point, I
have conceded that by having sex the pregnant woman has (except in the case of rape) done something that gives us some reason
to compel her to aid the fetus. On the other hand, the pregnant
57. The closest the Court has come was to vacate, with a request for clarification on
whether there was an adequate state ground, a California Supreme Court decision that
such a statute was unconstitutional under the federal Constitution, or under the California
constitution, or both. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965).
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woman has not done as much to establish a relationship with the
fetus as has the parent to establish a relationship with her child,
the voluntary rescuer to establish a relationship with the object
of the rescue, or even the innkeeper to establish a relationship
with his guest. If we bear in mind that no other potential samaritan is required to bear burdens as physically invasive as the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth, and if we bear in mind also that
no other potential samaritan (with the possible, but doubtful,"5
exception of the parent) is subjected to burdens remotely comparable in magnitude to the burdens imposed on the pregnant
woman, we conclude that laws forbidding abortion are at odds
with the general spirit of samaritan law."
One final point. When I suggest that the woman should not
be compelled to subordinate her interests to those of the fetus, I
sometimes meet withthe response: "But if she is allowed to have
an abortion, the fetus is subordinated. It is just a question of who
shall be subordinated to whom." In a sense, of course, this is
correct. There is a conflict of interest between the woman and the
fetus, and someone is going to lose. But that is true in every
samaritan situation. There is a conflict between the distressed
party's need for aid and the potential rescuer's desire not to give
it. The point is that our law generally resolves this conflict in
favor of the potential samaritan. When a woman is pregnant, it
is the fetus that needs aid and the woman who is in a position to
give it. If the conflict between the woman and the fetus is to be
resolved consistently with the resolutions of the most closely analogous cases, the woman must prevail.
58. See discussion at pages 1597-98 supra.
59. An issue I have not mentioned is whether, in view of the greater responsibility
for the fetus of the woman who has sex without taking measures against conception, a
state could make access to abortion conditional on responsible contraceptive use. In
theory, this suggestion has considerable appeal. But there are difficulties. Many women
are excusably ignorant concerning contraceptive methods. Perhaps before the state makes
contraceptive use a prerequisite to abortion it must do a better job of contraceptive
education. Also, there are significant side effects from many contraceptive methods. If,
as I have argued, the woman who conceives and then has an abortion does not make the
fetus worse off by her entire course of conduct, it is not clear that the woman should be
required to run any risk to herself in order to avoid these consequences to the fetus. Most
significantly, the invasions and uncertainty involved in enforcing a rule that conditioned
abortion on responsible contraceptive use would be extreme. More could be said on this
topic, but since no state has attempted to condition abortion on contraceptive use, no
more need be said in this essay.
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ABORTION As SELF-DEFENSE

I have already mentioned that for those who cannot bring
themselves to view removing a fetus from a woman's body as an
omission for purposes of the bad-samaritan principle, there is
another possibility. We can concede that the woman who has an
abortion actively kills the fetus but argue that she acts in selfdefense. We can view the woman who secures an abortion as
merely resisting the fetus's unjustified attack on her person.
Obviously the fetus is not like a willful attacker knowingly
bent on murder or mayhem. But, despite the absence of much
authority, it seems clear that the privilege of self-defense extends
beyond a privilege to resist willful attacks. Surely we would recognize a privilege to defend oneself against an assailant one knew
to be insane, even though such an assailant would be free of any
criminal liability. 0 Indeed, I have no doubt that we would recognize a privilege to defend oneself against an attacker whose conduct could not even be regarded as volitional." Suppose, for example, one found oneself cabined in a very small space with
someone who was seized by wild convulsions while holding a
sharp cleaver.
There are limits, of course, to the situations in which one can
harm an innocent person to avoid harm to oneself. If someone
begins to shoot at me, I cannot seize a completely uninvolved
bystander and use him as a shield. If I find myself and another
non-swimmer on a boat that is foundering, I cannot throw him
off to save myself. The question is, where does abortion fall on
this spectrum?
It may help to recall some facts about the early stages of fetal
life. The fetus begins as a zygote, inside the woman but unattached. It is not until days later that it adheres to the uterine
wall, then burrows into the endometrium, sprouts chorionic villi,
and grapples onto the woman's insides. Once attached, it sends
out its own hormone signals, which trigger the enormous changes
pregnancy works on the woman's body." The woman simply is
not pregnant until the blastocyst latches on and commandeers
the woman's metabolism. On this account, the fetus may seem
60. See ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04, comment 5 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). The
Restatement (Second) of Torts takes no position on this question. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 64 (caveat), 66 (caveat) (1965).
61. See Kadish, supra note 22, at 68.
62. See generally J. GREENHILL & E. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 25-29.
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less "active" than the violent insane attacker or even than the
person in convulsions brandishing a cleaver, but the fetus is not
at all like an uninvolved bystander. The fetus is involved with the
woman carrying it, and it is the fetus's presence and nothing else
that threatens harm to the woman. Nor does the fetus seem like
the second occupant of a foundering boat. The difference, of
course, is that the woman is the boat. Perhaps the closest analogue of abortion would be a case where two persons are in an
ocean together without any boat at all, swimming or treading
water. One tires first and begins in a delirium to cling to the
other. Surely the one being clung to may disentangle himself and
3
save himself if he can.
There may be some special wrinkles to self-defense against
innocent attackers. First, the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests that there may be a duty to retreat before using force
against an innocent attacker in cases where retreat would not be
required if the attack were willful 4 But there is never a duty to
retreat except where the harm threatened can be avoided by retreating. There is no escape from the burdens of pregnancy save
abortion. Second, there may be no privilege to defend oneself
against an innocent attacker if one has provoked or invited the
attack.65 I have noted previously that (except in the case of rape)
the pregnant woman has done something which made her pregnancy more likely, indeed which made it possible. But at least if
the woman has attempted to avoid pregnancy, she can hardly be
said to have invited the fetus's attack any more than one invites
attack by walking near a mental hospital where one knows there
are some violent inmates. Finally, it could be suggested that even
if there is a privilege to defend oneself against an innocent attacker, there is no privilege to defend a third person against an
innocent attacker, since that involves choosing between two innocents without being impelled by the desire for self-preservation.
(The defense-of-third-persons problem arises because women
need the assistance of doctors to have safe abortions.) Suffice it
to say in response that after early vacillation, our law now generally recognizes privileges to defend third persons wherever they
63. Surely also the stronger swimmer may disentangle himself from the weaker, even
if he could carry the weaker swimmer to safety but only at the cost of serious injury to
himself caused by the extra exertion and prolonged exposure to stressful conditions.

64.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

ToRTs § 64, comment b (1965).

65. See ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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are privileged to defend themselves." Surely the asymmetry between the innocent attacker and the innocent attacked is reason
enough to allow third persons to intervene on behalf of the latter.
Surely if a woman can defend herself against the fetus, a doctor
7
may help.
I have saved for last the most troublesome question raised by
the self-defense analysis. On this analysis, the woman is killing
the fetus. How does one answer the suggestion that, provided the
mother's life is not at stake, the privilege of self-defense is lost
because abortion involves excessive force?
Observe first that abortion does not involve force which is
excessive in the sense of being greater than necessary to avoid the
threatened harm. The woman cannot be spared the burdens of
pregnancy without killing the fetus. It might be suggested that if
the post-partum interests of the woman are ignored on the ground
that they can be avoided by giving the child up for adoption, then
the burdens of late pregnancy and delivery can be avoided without killing the fetus by removing the viable fetus during the last
trimester. But this is a dangerous operation for the woman, surely
involving a sufficient risk of death or serious bodily harm so that
she can defend herself against the prospect by removing the fetus
earlier. The question, then, is whether abortion is excessive in the
sense that the harm to the woman involved in a normal pregnancy and delivery is just not great enough to justify killing the
fetus.
According to the Model Penal Code, deadly force may be
used to defend oneself against death, serious bodily harm, rape,
or kidnapping. 8 We must consider whether, in cases where the
risk to the woman's life is minimal, the burdens of pregnancy and
childbirth can be assimilated either to serious bodily harm or to
rape. To my mind, there is a good case on both counts.
The Model Penal Code, although it talks of "serious bodily
66. See materials cited in note 5 supra.

67. Model Penal Code provisions making self-abortion a lesser crime than abortionon-others and forbidding aid-to-suicide even though suicide is not a crime. ALI MODEL
PENAL CODE §§ 230.3, 210.5 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), are not examples of rejecting

intervention by third parties even though the act of the "principal" is innocent. The
authors of the Model Penal Code plainly do not approve of either self-abortion or suicide.
They treat them as lesser crimes or as no crime at all for reasons of common sense and

efficient administration.
68. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Cf.
OF ToRS § 65 (1965) (allowing the use of deadly force in selfdefense against a threat of death, serious bodily harm, or ravishment).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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harm", never defines it. It does define "serious bodily injury",
used in analogous contexts in such a way as to suggest that the
phrases are intended to be equivalent, as "bodily injury which
creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ."69 The comments to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts also indicate that the permanent
or protracted loss of function of any important member or organ
counts as serious bodily harm. 70
What a woman suffers from pregnancy is a protracted impairment of function of her body as a whole. It does not seem
particularly plausible to view her as losing the function of a member or an organ. If it were important to identify an organ, we could
specify several whose functioning is altered during pregnancy: the
pituitary and the hypothalamus, for example. But the real point
is that the woman's entire hormonal system and consequently her
entire body are altered. Aside from the pain and discomfort of
being pregnant, any activities that demand grace, flexibility, balance, coordination, muscle tone, or significant physical exertion
are likely to be impossible for the last half of the pregnancy.
Surely for an athlete or a dancer, the last four months of pregnancy would involve protracted loss of important bodily functions. And even for the woman who is not primarily an athlete or
a dancer, sports or dancing or comparable physical activities may
be very important.
It is interesting to note that one of the comments in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts includes an illustration which
strongly implies that a broken arm is serious bodily harm.' The
illustration in question does not say that a broken arm is serious
bodily harm, because the primary object of the illustration is not
to define serious bodily harm but rather to indicate the legal
effect of a mistake on the part of the attacker about the extent of
harm he is likely to cause. Nor does the illustration specifically
say that deadly force can be used to avoid the broken arm, since
what force can be used depends in part on how much force is
actually necessary in the circumstances. However, the illustration appears in connection with the basic section on the use of
deadly force in self-defense, and it would lose its point if it were
not intended that a broken arm should represent a higher level
69. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63, comment b (1965).
71. Id. § 65, Illustration 2.
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of harm than the harm which justifies the use of non-deadly force.
It seems to me that, so far as one can compare these things, a
broken arm and pregnancy involve similar interferences with normal physical activity.
There will be those who suggest that pregnancy does not
represent any "impairment" or "loss of function". This suggestion seems plausible because there is a sense in which pregnancy
is "normal" while a broken arm is not. Even for a woman who
wants to be pregnant, however, pregnancy entails a significant
interference with normal activities. To say that pregnancy is
"normal" in some sense, and even often desired, is not to say that
it imposes no costs. Furthermore, as I have said before, the proper
point of view in this discussion is the point of view of the woman
who does not want to be pregnant. For her the pregnancy represents a major burden without redeeming benefits.
Two further objections may be made against my suggestion
that an unwanted pregnancy is serious bodily harm justifying the
use of deadly force in self-defense. First, it might be suggested
that the force used to repel an attack must always be proportionate to the harm threatened, and that even if pregnancy constitutes serious bodily harm, it cannot be avoided at the cost of the
death of the fetus. This objection ignores the fact that, in formulating many sorts of rules, our law tends to divide physical harms
into two categories. One category is death-or-serious-bodilyinjury. The other category is harms less than death-or-seriousbodily-injury. Whatever some people might like, our law does not
take the position that death is in a class by itself. 72 Unquestionably one can kill in self-defense in order to avoid some harms less
than death. Surely one can kill to avoid being made a quadriplegic. Surely one can kill to avoid being made a paraplegic.
Surely one can kill to avoid being blinded. There is, of course, a
line-drawing problem. But we frequently operate on the assumption that there is one line, between death-or-serious-bodily-injury
and everything less.
It might still be said, however, that before something can
count as serious bodily injury it must involve a substantial risk
of death. It is probably true that most cases where an attacker
threatens serious bodily injury involve a significant risk of death,
and it may be that this is one reason why we assimilate serious
72. Our law does sometimes take the position that death is in a class by itself, as in
formulating the law of murder. But it does not treat death as special in all contexts.
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bodily injury to death. But I think it is not true that before something can count as serious bodily harm it must involve a risk of
death. The Model Penal Code and the Restatement both say
quite explicitly that serious bodily injury is injury which involves
either substantial risk of death or protracted loss of an important
physical function. The broken arm illustration, noted above, involves no risk of death (and pregnancy does, though not a risk so
substantial that I would argue pregnancy was serious bodily harm
on that account alone).
Let us consider now whether pregnancy can be assimilated
to rape, which is generally understood to justify the use of deadly
force in self-defense. Why is rape so appalling that a woman may
kill to avoid it? Being raped is likely to be painful. Given the
habits of rapists as a class, being raped also involves a significant
risk of death. Being raped involves an intrusion into the most
intimate parts of the body. Being raped may create fears and
anxieties that interfere with the victim's normal sexual relations.
Finally, being raped is humiliating because the victim's body is
being used, treated purely as a physical object.
Everything I have just said about rape is true also of pregnancy imposed by prohibitions on abortion. Pregnancy is painful.
It involves a significant risk of death. It represents an intrusion
into the most intimate parts of the woman's body. It is likely to
interfere directly with sexual relations while it continues (during
the latter part of the pregnancy), and the fear of pregnancy, if
abortion is not available, is likely to make sexual relations less
satisfactory even after the pregnancy is over. Finally, the woman
who is compelled to carry a fetus she does not want is in effect
being used as an incubator. She is being used as a physical object
quite as much as the victim of rape.
There are differences, of course. Being raped may make a
woman fearful every time she goes out into the street. Indeed, it
may make her fearful everywhere, whether or not she is one of
those victims so unfortunate as to be raped in their homes. Unwanted pregnancy, in contrast, makes the victim fearful only of
sex. (Remember, however, that being fearful of sex may poison a
great deal more of one's life than just the time spent in intercourse.) Also, it may be that the statistical risk of death associated with rape is greater than that associated with pregnancy.
So far, I should say, we have mentioned differences of degree that
do not amount to differences in kind for present purposes.
One who objects to the comparison of pregnancy with rape
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is much more likely to think there is an intrinsic horror to rape
that is absent from pregnancy. Does it not make a difference that
the rapist, unlike the fetus, is a full-sized, visible, malevolent,
active attacker?
At this point, it is difficult to know what to say. For a start,
anyone who attempts simply to deny that there is an intrinsic
horror to unwanted pregnancy lacks either imagination or compassion. Here both the woman's feelings of being used during the
pregnancy and her dismay at the consequent choice between actually raising the child and giving it up for adoption are plainly
relevant. Also, if rape involves a malevolent, active attacker who
uses the victim's body, laws forbidding abortion involve the requisitioning of the woman's body by the state. Is it clearly worse
to be treated as an object by one deviant individual than to be
relegated to the status of a broodmare (for this is how the pregnant woman may well view the matter) by society at large?
Two final points. First, we are discussing, in this section,
self-defense against an innocent attacker. The general rules of
self-defense allow the use of deadly force to avoid serious bodily
harm or rape, and I have argued previously that we would allow
the use of deadly force to avoid serious bodily harm at the hands
of an innocent attacker. But it might be thought that rape is
different, that the injury from rape depends more on the hostility
of the attacker. It might therefore be suggested that deadly force
cannot be used on the innocent rapist or, by extension, on the
fetus. There is something in this suggestion. Imagine a woman
being raped by a man whom she knows is suffering from the
insane delusion that she is his wife, who enjoys resisting and
being taken by force. (We can make the attacker more sympathetic by supposing-that he actually has such a wife and that his
delusion concerns only the identity of the woman he is attacking.)
Would this woman be permitted to kill her assailant, if
necessary? Certainly the case is harder than that of the ordinary
"sane" rapist. To my mind the case is less strong from the
woman's point of view than the case of pregnancy imposed by
laws against abortion. Yet I believe that if the case arose a privilege to use deadly force would be found.
Finally, it might be suggested that all the normal rules about
self-defense assume the impossibility of deliberation - that, at
least to the extent these rules allow deadly force to be used for
any other purpose -than to avoid death, they represent a concession to the way imperfect human beings will behave in emergen-
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cies. The fetus is unique among "attackers" in that it allows its
victim time to reflect; and it could be argued that the woman
should decide, on reflection, to submit to the fetus's intrusion and
the attendant costs so long as her own life is not at stake. I have
no decisive response to this argument, but I do not find it convincing. I admit that the justification for the use of deadly force
in response to non-deadly force seems weaker when there is time
to reflect. On the other hand, comparison of the law of selfdefense with the law of voluntary manslaughter and of duress
makes it clear that the right of self-defense is not merely a concession to predictable human weakness. The law of self-defense is
shaped in part by the notion that there is an asymmetry between
attacker and attacked (even when the attacker is innocent) which
justifies the attacked in protecting himself or herself even in some
cases where the cost to the attacker is greater than the harm from
which the attacked is spared.
Ill.

THE CONsTrTTIONAL ARGUMENT

I have spent quite a number of pages trying to show that if
we viewed abortion as a problem in samaritan law, or if we viewed
it as a problem in the law of self-defense, abortion would be
allowed. It is time now to say more about the constitutional argument I think my observations support. I shall treat explicitly only
the constitutional argument suggested by the discussion of samaritan law. An argument that is similar in outline could be
based on the law of self-defense, but I find the samaritan argument more persuasive. Enough of what I say about the samaritan
argument would carry over to the self-defense argument that a
separate treatment of the latter is unnecessary. Having spelled
out the constitutional argument, I shall comment briefly on two
further topics: (1) the advantages of my argument over the
Court's actual argument in Roe, and (2) the consequences of my
argument for other problems in the general area.
A.

The Nature of the Argument

John Hart Ely has rightly insisted that constitutional arguments ought to be based on values that can be inferred from the
text of the Constitution, the thinking of the Framers, or the structure of our national government.13 The argument against laws
73. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973).
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prohibiting abortion is based on three such values: nonsubordination, freedom from physical invasion, and equal protection. Before I specify the precise nature of the argument, let me
say a few words about the first two of the values just mentioned.
The non-subordination value that is implicit in the badsamaritan principle of the common law is also at the core of the
thirteenth amendment. The thirteenth amendment speaks not
merely of slavery, but of "involuntary servitude". In numerous
cases,74 the Supreme Court plainly viewed peonage as a form of
involuntary servitude, and not just as a vestige of slavery which
Congress may prohibit on a theory like that of Jones v. Mayer.75
The objection to peonage is best summed up in one of the early
decisions, by then Associate Justice Hughes: "The plain intention [of the thirteenth amendment] was to abolish slavery of
whatever name and form.

.

.; to make labor free, by prohibiting

that control by which the personal service of one man is disposed
of or coerced for another's benefit which is the essence of involuntary servitude. 7' 8 Unwilling pregnancy is not slavery in the fullest
sense, nor does it involve labor of the sort Hughes was referring
to; but it certainly involves the disposition and coercion of the
(intensely) personal service of one "man" for another's benefit. 77

The second value, freedom from physical invasion or imposed physical pain or hardship, is embodied in the eighth
amendment and also plainly counts among those fundamental
values of our society which are traditionally subsumed under fifth
and fourteenth amendment due process. The due process clauses
are vague, and it might be objected that to say something is
subsumed under the due process clauses is not really to name a
connection with any recognized constitutional value at all. That
may be true in some cases, where the claim that something comes
under the due process clauses is a novel one. But there is nothing
novel about the claim that the due process clauses speak to the
74. E.g., Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219
(1911).
75. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
76. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911).
77. Peonage is not less objectionable when it is "voluntarily" entered into. Pollock
v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 24 (1944). Nor is peonage less "involuntary servitude" because it
is not a permanent status. (Peonage contracts apparently tended to be open-ended, the
effective term being "until the laborer pays back his advance". In Pollock, the Court
overturned a conviction secured less than three months after the laborer received his
advance. In Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), there was a definite term of one year.)
On both counts, compare an unwanted pregnancy which the woman is forbidden to terminate.
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matter of physical maltreatment. 8
It may be that an adequate constitutional argument against
abortion statutes could be based on these two values alone. The
non-subordination value is not enough to prevent all impositions
of duties to aid, as many of the exceptions to the bad-samaritan
principle, involving trivial impositions, make clear. Similarly the
physical integrity value is not enough to prevent all physical invasions, nor even all serious physical invasions, as the example of
the draft and perhaps the example of medically proven and carefully supervised aversive therapies make clear. But the woman
who is prevented from terminating her pregnancy can appeal
simultaneously to both of these values. There is no other case, I
believe, in which the law imposes comparable physical invasion
and hardship as an obligation of samaritanism. We might plausibly suggest that imposing such invasion and hardship for the
benefit of a third person is flatly inconsistent with our nation's
fundamental traditions.
There are two difficulties with this suggestion. First, I am not
certain that laws imposing comparable impositions more uniformly would be, or should be, held unconstitutional. If a state
altered the bad-samaritan principle by statute, creating an obligation to undertake even physically dangerous rescues, I would
be disinclined to say that the new statute was unconstitutional.
Nor am I confident that the Court would invalidate it. Similarly,
if a state passed a statute requiring parents to donate needed
organs to their children (where this would not endanger the life
of the parent), I am not certain that the statute would be, or
should be, held unconstitutional. If these hypothetical statutes
would be held unconstitutional (and I am sure some readers will
think they would be), then statutes forbidding abortion should be
held unconstitutional for the same reasons. But if these hypothetical statutes would not be unconstitutional, then abortion statutes cannot be held unconstitutional just on the basis of the values so far considered.
The second difficulty with the argument under consideration
(to the effect that, equal protection aside, laws forbidding abortion violate our fundamental traditions with regard to nonsubordination and physical integrity) is the fact that statutes
forbidding abortion had, until Roe, been on the books in all states
for many years. This history does not conclude the constitutional
78. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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question. On occasion, the Court has overturned a great deal of
history. But the Court has rarely overturned as much history all
at once as it did in Roe v. Wade. That surely ought to give us
pause.
I do not say, of course, that history is entirely on the side of
those who would defend abortion statutes. The values of nonsubordination and freedom from physical invasion are very much
a part of our history. Although arguments nominally based on our
"fundamental traditions" often have little to do with our traditions, fundamental or otherwise, that is not true of the
"fundamental traditions" argument I have suggested.
On the other hand, there is no logical reason why our traditions forbidding subordination of one individual to another, or
forbidding physical invasions, should not recognize exceptions. It
is not implausible to suggest that one of the exceptions our traditions recognize is for laws prohibiting abortion. That is why I do
not find the pure "fundamental traditions" argument sufficient.
We need to bring in the equal protection value. We need to
argue that even if those parts of our tradition which forbid subordination or physical invasion have historically included an exception for abortion laws, the exception is impermissible. It creates
an inequality that is inconsistent with an even more fundamental
part of our tradition, reflected in the equal protection clause and
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. It is no accident,
I think, that the greatest inroads on history (that is, the most
sweeping invalidations of existing legal arrangements) have come
in equal protection decisions like Reynolds v. Sims and Brown
0 For
v. Board of Education."
all of our failures in the pursuit of
equality, and for all of our (justifiable) uncertainty about just
what equality means, there are few values, perhaps none, with
deeper roots in our traditions or a firmer hold on our imaginations
than the value of equal treatment under law.
Some readers may doubt that the value underlying the equal
protection clause is relevant to the abortion problem. Antiabortion statutes do not look like the sort of statute that normally
raises equal protection issues. The state does not draw a line
between blacks and whites, or between women and men, and
treat the two classes differently. The state does not even draw a
line between optometrists and opticians and say the former may
79. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
80. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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offer services which the latter may not.8 ' The state simply says
that no one may have an abortion. It is true that only some people
want abortions. But so long as the state denies abortions to
everyone who wants them, there does not seem to be a problem
of the equal protection variety.
To see the equal protection problem, we must look at abortion in a broader context. Life in society produces many situations in which one individual is in a position to give needed aid
to another individual. That is to say, life in society offers.many
opportunities to be a good or bad samaritan. The objection to an
anti-abortion statute is that it picks out certain potential samaritans, namely women who want abortions, and treats them in a
way that is at odds with the law's treatment of other potential
samaritans. Women who want abortions are required to give aid
in circumstances where closely analogous potential samaritans
and an extent
are not. And they are required to give aid of a kind
82
that is required of no other potential samaritan.
The preceding paragraph, sketchy as it is, is enough to reveal
that the equal protection argument I am suggesting is nonstandard in two respects. First, I do not claim that the situation
of the woman who wants an abortion has any perfect analogue
among the situations of other potential samaritans. The abortion
case is unique in requiring us to view what is in some sense an
act as being, for purposes of samaritan law, an omission. The
abortion case also differs from every other case except that of
parenthood in that the woman has, by her prior behavior, contributed to the creation of the fetus which needs her assistance.
I argued in the course of the discussion of samaritan law that
the woman seeking an abortion falls somewhere on a spectrum of
eligibility for compulsion to be a samaritan, a spectrum that runs
from the totally uninvolved bystander at one end to the parent
at the other. I do not assert that the pregnant woman is placed
under greater burdens than other potential samaritans who are
precisely as eligible for compulsion. It is not clear just where on
the spectrum the pregnant woman belongs. Rather, I suggest that
the burdens imposed on the pregnant woman are out of line with
the general treatment of other potential samaritans all along the
spectrum. There are some cases in which other potential samari81. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
82. Recall that the draft, which might seem to provide a counterexample, is not a
true samaritan case at all.
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tans who might be viewed as less eligible for compulsion are nonetheless compelled. But the burdens they are compelled to assume
are incomparably less than the burdens of pregnancy. Parents,
who are the most eligible potential samaritans, are placed under
heavy burdens. But even these burdens are not physically invasive in the way that pregnancy is, and no state imposes on parents
(or, I think, would impose if a case came up) the burdens that
would be most comparable to the burdens of pregnancy, such as
the burdens of a genuinely dangerous rescue or of compulsory
83
organ donation.
I said earlier that there were two respects in which my equal
protection argument is non-standard. One respect, which I have
been discussing, is the lack of any precise analogue for the pregnant woman. The other respect, which is related but distinct, is
that the argument goes so far afield for its comparisons. Laws
which classify on the basis of race or sex, or which draw lines
between opticians and optometrists or between advertising on a
truck for the owner's business and advertising for someone
else's," suggest equal protection issues to anyone. But most people, unprompted, do not connect the abortion problem and the
problem of samaritanism. It may seem that courts should not
look so far afield. There are enough equal protection problems
presented on the faces of statutes without looking for problems
in imaginative comparisons. As Justice Douglas said in Railway
Express Agency v. New York, "[T]he fact that New York City
sees fit to eliminate from traffic this kind of distraction [certain
advertising on the sides of trucks] but does not touch even
83. As a matter of logic, it might seem that the strongest part of my argument is the
comparison of the woman seeking an abortion with the parent. Should I not simply say
that the woman seeking an abortion, who is less eligible for compulsion than the parent,
is subjected to greater burdens (or at least greater burdens of the particular physically
invasive sort that are specially disfavored) and leave it at that, eschewing comparison
with any other potential samaritans? There are three reasons for not doing this. First, the
most telling comparisons between the woman seeking an abortion and the parent are in a
sense hypothetical. I assume that parents are not required to rescue their children from
burning buildings or to donate organs. Certainly there are no statutes or cases imposing
such obligations. But then, so far as I know, there are no statutes or cases specifically
rejecting such obligations either. There is simply no explicit authority. Second, parents
do bear heavy burdens, of a general sort, even if they are subjected to less in the way of
physical invasion than the pregnant woman. Finally, since the pregnant woman is not
precisely analogous to any other potential samaritan, but is somewhere in the middle of
the spectrum of eligibility for compulsion, it seems foolish to drop from the argument the
fact that in virtually all cases where obligations of samaritanism are imposed, the burdens
are trivial.
84. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).

HeinOnline -- 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1623 1978-1979

1624

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 77:1569

greater ones in a different category, such as the vivid displays on
Times Square, is immaterial. It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at
all."' I shall refer to the notion that courts should not concern
themselves, in equal protection analysis, with comparisons so farranging as that between the pregnant woman and other potential
samaritans as the "too far afield" objection to my argument.
We now have before us two questions: (1) What do we make
Qf the "too far afield" objection? In other words, should the Court
even consider an argument which proceeds by comparing the
pregnant woman and other potential samaritans? (2) If the argument merits consideration, does it justify the conclusion that laws
prohibiting abortion are unconstitutional? It might seem that the
first question is logically prior to the second and should be disposed of first. Whatever the logic of the matter, the considerations relevant to the two questions overlap considerably. Because
the second question is of a more familiar sort than the first, I
propose to begin with the second question. Let us hold the "too
far afield" objection in abeyance and attack the substantive
issue.
If there were a non-controversial general theory of equal protection, all we would need to do at this point would be to apply
the general theory to the case of abortion. Unfortunately, there
is no non-controversial theory. Even more unfortunately, I do not
have a general theory to suggest. Still, given the uncertain state
of equal protection theory, it seems desirable to say something on
a general level before turning to the specific problem at hand.
What I propose to do is to describe some features I think an
acceptable general theory is likely to have. My list of general
features will be in some degree controversial, but I think it will
establish enough common ground between me and a sufficient
number of readers that I can then proceed to a meaningful discussion of the abortion problem. I would emphasize that little of
what I shall say on the general level is original. Nor will it be
necessary for the reader to accept everything in my general
remarks to find elements of the specific argument about abortion
persuasive. Finally, I would observe that within the tolerance of
this schematic presentation, I think I shall be describing both
what courts ought to be doing in the equal protection area and
what the Supreme Court is doing. (What the Court is doing is
85. 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
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somewhat different, in my view, from what the majority of Justices say they are doing.)
For a start, I approve of the "new equal protection" to this
extent: I think it is appropriate to subject different laws to different levels of judicial "scrutiny". Actually, to say one law deserves
more scrutiny than another may mean two quite different things.
It may mean that judicial resources are more appropriately spent
in reviewing the law which deserves more scrutiny, or it may
mean that that law should be held to a higher standard of justification in terms of its tendency to promote significant state interests. The Court has generally concentrated on the second meaning, ignoring the first so far as theory goes. (They have not ignored
it in their traditionally unexplained decisions regarding choice of
cases.) Ordinarily, considerations that tend to justify heightened
scrutiny in the sense of greater judicial attention will also tend
to justify it in the sense of requiring a stronger justification for
the law, and vice versa. But there may be some situations in
which special judicial attention is called for, but not a requirement of special justification. As it turns out, this distinction between different ways of giving special scrutiny is of limited relevance to the present problem. I shall have scant occasion
(though I shall have some occasion) to mention the distinction in
what follows.
Although I accept the idea of different levels of scrutiny, I do
not think the Court's official "two-tier" model is satisfactory. I
agree with those Justices and commentators who think the Court
is not actually applying such a model." Instead of regarding all
classifications as either suspect or innocent, the Court seems to
perceive a range of classifications of varying degrees of suspectness. Race is thoroughly suspect, along with national origin or
ethnicity. Sex and illegitimacy are somewhat suspect, but not as
suspect as race. Alienage is probably still somewhat suspect,
though the question is confused by the federalism aspects. Similarly, there is a range of rights - some more fundamental, some
less. The right to vote is fundamental, but not quite so fundamental is the right to vote by absentee ballot." The right of a criminal
86. E.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-137 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-14 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1972).
87. See McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969). But see
O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974).
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defendant to certain assistance in his defense is fundamental.
The right to education is apparently fundamental up to a point,
but not fundamental or certainly less fundamental thereafter."
Marriage and divorce seem both to be "somewhat" fundamen89

tal.

Although I do not endorse all the Court's decisions about
which classifications are suspect (and to what degree) and about
which rights are fundamental (and to what degree), I regard the
general approach the Court seems to be following as the correct
one. I approve of "variable suspectness", "variable fundamentality", and consequent "variable scrutiny".
I do not think the eventual scrutiny should be just a matter
of vetting the law in issue for an appropriate degree of "goodness
of fit" between means and ends. We could build a theory in which
the suspectness of classifications and the fundamentality of rights
were appealed to only as the basis for selecting an appropriate
level of review for the "goodness of fit". But that is not the sort
of theory I have in mind. The mere use of suspect classifications
imposes costs. Any impairment of fundamental rights is a cost.
Differential impairment of different persons' fundamental rights
is a special cost. These costs must be justified by what is achieved
by the law under review. A law that is perfectly designed to
achieve an insufficiently important end is still unacceptable.
It may seem that what I have sketched so far is a "balancing"
approach to equal protection. We throw into the scales on the
individual's side the costs imposed by the use of suspect classifications or by the impairment of fundamental rights. These costs
Will of course vary with the degree of suspectness of the classification or the degree of fundamentality of the right involved. We
throw into the scales on the government's side the benefits
achieved by the law, which depend upon the weightiness of the
state interest and the degree to which the law promotes the interest. Then we "balance".
This sketch of the process is not entirely off the mark, but it
is incomplete or misleading in two respects. First, and most important, talk of balancing suggests that any interests of the individual are eligible to be labeled "fundamental" and put into the
scales against the law. One of the unsatisfactory aspects of the
88. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973).
89. As to marriage, compare Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), with Califano
v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977); as to divorce, compare Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971), with Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
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Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade (which is not, of course, an equal
protection opinion but which does deal with "fundamental
rights") is that it lists a variety of interests belonging to a pregnant woman that laws against abortion may impair, but it gives
very little attention to the question of which of these interests are
actually protected by the Constitution. Under the scheme I have
in mind, rights would be regarded as fundamental or classifications as suspect only if the rights in question were protected, or
the classifications disfavored, by the Constitution or by constitutionally based values as developed in our legal tradition. (Incidentally, it seems to me that if we try to identify fundamental
rights and suspect classifications by reference to. our constitutional tradition, it is almost inevitable that we should end up with
"variable fundamentality" and "variable suspectness". It would
be a poor tradition indeed, and not ours, which recognized only
two degrees of importance of rights, or only two degrees of acceptability of classifications.)
The second reason the "balancing" sketch above is misleading is that it suggests that once the Court has decided to take an
equal protection question seriously, there is no further room for
deference to the legislature. Obviously deference to legislative
judgment is not something that is easily defined or quantified,
but I think some deference is appropriate even in cases where
specially protected rights or specially disfavored classifications
are involved.
I prefer to think of my suggested approach to equal protection as a "reasonable American legislature test". According to
this test, an inequality of treatment imposed by the law is unconstitutional if and only if it is one that a reasonable American
legislature could not countenance. The reference to reasonableness (which is something more than mere rationality) captures
the balancing aspects of the approach, the role of specially
protected rights and specially disfavored classifications. The
reference to the reasonable American legislature reminds us
that decisions about what rights and classifications raise special
problems are to be made on the basis of our constitutional
tradition. Finally, the formulation of the test in terms of the
behavior of a reasonable American legislature emphasizes that
even when dealing with fundamental rights or suspect classifications, legislatures must have some leeway.
Labels, for all their usefulness, can be misleading. Although
I have attempted to explain my choice of the phrase "reasonable
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American legislature test", there is some danger that the phrase
will create precisely the wrong impression. I do not suggest that
the Court should try to decide what it would do if it were the
legislature. The question is not what the "ideally reasonable"
legislature would do, but rather what a "humanly reasonable"
legislature (steeped in and concerned for our national traditions)
could do. A law is constitutional, under this test, if a reasonable
American legislature could pass it or fail to repeal it. The relationship I envision between the Court and the legislature is somewhat like the relationship between a trial judge and trial jury.
Another aspect of the theory I am now outlining deserves
mention. Legislative purpose is important. The Court may have
gone slightly too far in its unqualified pronouncements about the
importance of purpose in recent cases,9 but basically it is on the
right track. Suspect classifications are suspect in considerable
part because of the "badge of inferiority" aspect, and because
they are specially resented. A classification that is neutral (nonsuspect) on its face but that produces effects significantly describable in terms of some non-neutral (suspect) classification
does not have the same "badge of inferiority" aspect unless the
apparently neutral classification was chosen by the legislature
with a bad purpose, that is, as a surrogate for an impermissible
classification.
Justice Stevens is right to remind us that bad effects are
often the best evidence of bad purpose. 1 And Paul Brest is right
to suggest that indifference to bad effects may sometimes be so
extreme as to count as bad purpose.92 (This is especially likely to
be the case where what is in issue is the legislature's failure to
repeal or modify a scheme that was adopted with innocent purposes, but that now produces bad effects.) But as a general proposition, where the only objection to a statute is that it has bad
effects (in terms of suspect classifications), the legislature's innocent purpose ought to protect the law from being held unconstitutional.
This treatment of purpose is also suggested, to my mind, by
the label of the "reasonable American legislature test". It may be
that an ideal legislature would never pass a law that had a dispar90. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Personnel Adnr. v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 228
(1979).
91. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253-54 (Stevens, J., concurring).
92. Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Foreword: In Defense of the Anti.
discriminationPrinciple, 90 HARv. L. RaV. 1, 14-15 (1976).
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ate impact on a class protected against purposeful discrimination
without weighing the special costs such a disparate impact
would impose by aggravating historic disadvantages. But unless
the disparate impact is extreme, it is enough for the humanly
reasonable legislature to avoid, or to weigh carefully, the explicit
use of suspect classifications and to refrain from using apparently
neutral classifications with the purpose of discriminating.13
So much for my outline of an equal protection theory. The
approach I suggest will strike many readers as unacceptably
"unprincipled". I concede that the "reasonable American legislature test" does not lend itself to mechanical application. On the
other hand, it should not be taken as a license for unbridled
judicial interference with legislative decisions. The court applying this test should be constrained both by attention to our tradition and by deference to legislative decisions. Those constraints
can be real even though they are not precisely definable nor their
effects on judicial decision precisely measurable. Furthermore,
within the context of a fairly loose general theory, it is still possible for judges to tell us a great deal about why individual cases
strike them as they do, and why different cases strike them differently. Candid discussion by judges along these lines may tell us
more about both the judges' thinking and our traditions than
discussions concerning the application of some purportedly mechanical test. The "reasonable American legislature test" may do
little more than emphasize that there is no mechanical test in the
equal protection area. But it is better to have a vague "test" that
captures the right idea than a precise test that captures some
wrong idea.
93. Just as legislative purpose is relevant, so is legislative process. That is, whether
a law is constitutional may in some cases appropriately turn on what the legislature

thought about in passing it, and on how hard they thought about it. There are at least
two reasons for this. First, a legislative judgment about what is required by our constitutional tradition is entitled to some deference. How much deference the judgment is entitled to in any particular case depends in part on how thoroughly considered it was (if it
was made explicitly at all). Second, and probably more important, the legislature is
entitled to rely on any empirical proposition that an American legislature could reasonably accept. The fact that a legislature has acted on a particular empirical proposition is

always evidence that a reasonable legislature could accept it. But the strength of this
evidence varies with the amount and nature of the consideration given by the legislature
to the empirical proposition in question. Although I think there are probably objections
to the legislative process behind many abortion statutes - particularly regarding the
extent to which significant constitutional interests have been overlooked - I shall not rely
on process arguments in this essay. Deficiencies of process can be cured. But even careful
legislative reconsideration would not answer the objections to abortion laws detailed
below.
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It is time to return to the abortion problem and to explain
why abortion laws are specially problematic and why, ultimately,
they should be held unconstitutional. In the process I shall expand implicitly on some of the features of my general approach
to equal protection. I shall continue to hold the "too far afield"
objection (the objection that my comparison of the pregnant
woman to other potential samaritans ranges too far afield for an
equal protection argument) in abeyance for the present.
First, it is important that the inequality of treatment between pregnant women and other potential samaritans touches
on the constitutional values of non-subordination and freedom
from physical invasion. A woman who is denied an abortion is
compelled to serve the fetus and to suffer physical invasion, pain,
and hardship. As already noted, it can be argued that the Constitution prohibits this imposition outright, without regard to any
inequality of treatment. I have said that I do not find this argument persuasive. But the fact that such an argument can plausibly be made surely means that any inequality of treatment we
can point to becomes harder to justify. Inequalities with regard
to interests given specific constitutional protection are likely to
be more costly, in terms of our community value structure, to the
relatively disadvantaged parties than inequalities involving other
interests. For this reason, and also because of the apparent hypocrisy of guaranteeing a full measure of the constitutionally
sanctioned interest for some people but not for others, inequalities with regard to such interests are likely to be specially resented by the disadvantaged parties. If these inequalities are both
specially costly and specially resented, that is surely some reason
for the Court to look at them carefully and to require special
justification for them.
I have indicated that subjective resentment on the part of the
individuals disadvantaged is a significant element in equal protection analysis. It might be suggested that even women who
want abortions do not resent the specific inequality (between the
treatment of them and other potential samaritans) that I focus
on. There is some truth in this. The precise comparison between
pregnant women and other potential samaritans is not a standard
one. On the other hand, it is clear that there is a great deal of
resentment among women.of laws forbidding abortion. (That
many women do not feel this resentment does not strike me as
important. Many women do feel it.) Furthermore, it is clear that
a good deal of the resentment is based on a feeling among women
that they are being used in a way no one else, or almost no one
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else, in our society is ever used. The perception on the part of
women that they are being used - more specifically that their
bodies are being taken over by the state for the benefit of third
persons - in a way which is at odds with our society's general
practices is sufficient, to my mind, to constitute resentment of
the inequality I rely on.
Other reasons for the Court to give the abortion problem
special attention are related to the suspect classification idea.
Only women need abortions. Parents of both sexes might be required to undertake physically dangerous rescues, or to donate
organs, and people of both sexes find themselves in most of the
standard potential-samaritan situations. But the one potential
samaritan who is singled out for specially burdensome treatment
is a potential samaritan who must, given human physiology, be
female. Why is this important?
First, any inequality that flows from an unchosen and unalterable characteristic is likely to be specially resented. It also
works against the idea, deeply rooted in our culture, that people
ought to be masters of their own destinies, at least within the
limits of legally acceptable behavior that apply to everyone. Since
pregnancy happens only to women, and since no one has any
choice about whether to be a woman, susceptibility to pregnancy
(and to being in the position of wanting an abortion) is a nonchosen characteristic. (It is not an unalterable characteristic,
since a woman might have herself sterilized, but this method of
altering the characteristic itself involves a significant physical
invasion.)
It might be objected that even if susceptibility to pregnancy
is an unchosen characteristic, pregnancy itself is not, and that
laws attaching unpleasant consequences to pregnancy therefore
do not interfere with women's controlling their own destinies.
Even if such laws are resented, the objection continues, the resentment is unjustified. Now, many pregnancies are not chosen
in the fullest sense. They are the result of accident, of carelessness, or whatever. I assume this is true of the vast majority of
pregnancies which the women involved want to terminate by
abortion. What the objector presumably means, when he says
that pregnancy is not unchosen, is that the woman could avoid
pregnancy (leaving rape out of account) by eschewing sexual intercourse. This is true. Women could avoid becoming pregnant.
But the only method of avoiding pregnancy with certainty requires, for many people, extraordinary self-denial. The availability of sexual abstinence as a means of avoiding pregnancy does
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not, to my mind, eliminate the force of the suggestion that pregnancy is often sufficiently "unchosen" so that laws specially
disadvantaging pregnant women limit women's control of their
lives, are justifiably resented, and deserve more-than-minimal
judicial attention. 4
Another reason for heightened equal protection scrutiny of
abortion laws is that women (and perhaps pregnant women especially) have suffered from a history of discrimination in our society. They have suffered not just from occasional laws counter
to their interests, but from an extensive pattern of discriminatory
laws and social practices. This makes them suspicious and resentful (and justifiably suspicious and resentful) of any particular
inequality, however it is supposed to be justified. It is certainly
worth investing some extra judicial resources in review of laws
that impose inequalities tied to sex in order to allay this suspicion
and resentment. It is probably worth requiring more-thanminimal substantive justification for such laws, both to minimize
resentment and to avoid adding to the continuing burdens resulting from past injustices whose effects have not been entirely eliminated. An inequality that would be tolerable against a background of equal treatment may be intolerable when it is an extra
burden imposed on top of other disadvantages. 5
It is worth adding that, at the level of statistical generalities,
the women who suffer most from prohibitions on abortion are
likely to be the same women who have suffered most from other
sorts of discrimination or injustice. I have in mind both poor
women and women who want to pursue careers outside the home.
These two groups of women have suffered from distinct but overlapping injustices in our past, and they have probably both suf
fered more than the adequately-provided-for woman whose life
has focused primarily on her family.
It might be suggested that the "suspect classification" elements in the argument just presented should all be discounted
because there is (or may be) no legislative purpose to disadvantage women. I have indicated previously that innocent purpose is
relevant principally in cases where we are confronted with bad
effects of a classification which is not suspect on its face. Now the
inequality created by abortion laws is not expressly an inequality
between women and men. It is between pregnant persons and
94. The claim that pregnancy is "unchosen" for present purposes is refined somewhat
in the discussion at pages 1633-34 infra.
95. See Brest, supra note 92, at 10-11.
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others. But pregnancy is much more closely connected with sex,
both empirically and in our habits of thought, than are, say,
educational qualifications"6 or wealth" with race. Classification in
terms of pregnancy is sufficiently like classification explicitly in
terms of sex, especially when we remember the costs of definitively avoiding pregnancy, that classification in terms of pregnancy should be regarded as significantly suspect regardless of
legislative purpose.
Of course, to say that classification in terms of pregnancy
should be regarded as significantly suspect is not to say that all
laws disadvantaging pregnant women should be held unconstitutional. For example, I tend to think that Geduldig v. Aiello,9 8 in
which a California disability insurance plan for private employees
disabled by an injury or illness not covered by workmen's compensation was upheld by the Court even though the plan excluded normal pregnancies from coverage, was rightly decided.
Without discussing Geduldig extensively, it may help to illustrate
the approach to equal protection I have in mind if I explain why
a reasonable American legislature could regard the scheme at
issue in Geduldig quite differently from the statute at issue in
Roe.
First, no established constitutional interest was impaired in
Geduldig. The supposed "right to procreate" is not inferrable
from the text, historical background, or structure of the Constitution. In this respect it differs from the interests in nonsubordination and in freedom from physical pain and invasion.
Even if we say that there is a constitutionally protected interest
in procreation (citing the ninth amendment, the fourteenth
amendment privileges and immunities clause, and Skinner v.
9 ), that interest is not impaired by denying disability
Oklahoma"
benefits in connection with pregnancy in the same way that the
interests in non-subordination and physical integrity are impaired by laws forbidding abortion.
Furthermore, the choice to be pregnant is much more likely
to be a fully voluntary choice in the Geduldig context than in the
abortion context. Most women who want abortions did not want
to be pregnant in the first place. But I assume it is still the case
that most children in this country are wanted, which is to say that
96. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
97. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252

(1977).
98. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
99. 315 U.S. 535 (1942).
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most women who are pregnant and do not want an abortion did
want to be pregnant. To be sure, I am now generalizing. I am
ignoring cases such as the woman who did not want to be pregnant but who rejects abortion for moral reasons. But the likelihood that the relevant pregnancy is voluntary is very different in
Roe and Geduldig. Also, it is more appropriate to rely on generalizations, even if we know there are exceptions, when we are justifying features of an insurance scheme that allocates monetary benefits among a group of employees, than to do so when we are
justifying direct state interference with individual decisions. To
a considerable extent the real question in Geduldig is whether
those employees who do not want (additional) children shall subsidize, indirectly, those who do.
This discussion of the difference in "voluntariness" of the
pregnancies involved in Roe and in Geduldig suggests a refinement of the claim that classification in terms of pregnancy should
be assimilated to classifications in terms of sex. Perhaps we
should say that classifications in terms of pregnancy are just as
suspect as classifications in terms of sex for purposes of justifying
the expenditure of resources in judicial review, but that whether
they are as suspect for purposes of raising the level of required
substantive justification for the law in question depends on just
how "voluntary" are the pregnancies affected.
Before I attempt to say where all of this leaves us, let me
point out an argument I have not made. I have not suggested that
laws against abortion deserve special judicial scrutiny because
women are politically powerless or because most legislators are
male. That argument is not persuasive in this context. Both sides
in the abortion controversy have been well organized politically.
Further, many of the opponents of abortion are women. This is
simply not an issue to which the partial exclusion of women from
the political process is relevant. Generally speaking, the reasons
I have suggested for special judicial concern about abortion do not
depend on the political powerlessness of women as a class. On the
contrary, they show why legislators should not be able to hide
behind the claim that because many women oppose abortion the
sex-specificity of the burdens of unwanted pregnancy is irrelevant.
It is time to take stock. In view of the considerations I have
mentioned, could a reasonable American legislature pass or fail
to repeal a statute forbidding abortion? I think the answer is
"No." I am certain that most legislatures would defend laws
against abortion on the ground that they protect human life (or
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potential life). This is certainly the most promising defense of
such laws. But, in the context of our legal system, the defense is
inadequate. The inequality between the treatment of pregnant
women and the treatment of other potential samaritans who are
not required to undertake burdens (often very much smaller burdens) in order to save life is too great. The inequality trenches on
two distinct constitutionally protected interests - the interest in
non-subordination and the interest in freedom from serious physical invasion. In addition, the inequality disadvantages a class
that is defined by a non-chosen characteristic (whether sex or
unwanted pregnancy) and that has suffered from a history of
discrimination. This is more than any reasonable American legislature would tolerate.
An argument that might be made on the other side runs as
follows: As a society we simply discount the pain and invasion of
pregnancy, as compared to other pains of comparable intensity
or invasions of similar extent. We view pregnancy as special,
either because so many women undertake it voluntarily, or because it is a "natural" part of the process of continuing the
species, or both.
I do not deny that there is a tendency to view pregnancy as
special and to devalue accordingly the pain and invasion it involves. I suggest that this tendency is one that reasonable American legislators, looking squarely at the question properly formulated, would overcome. The fact that many women willingly undertake the burdens of pregnancy, for reasons of their own, is no
reason to discount the burdens as they affect women to whom
they are unwelcome. Similarly, the fact that some women must
bear children if the nation is to continue is no reason to impose
the burdens of pregnancy on women who are unwilling, so long
as there is an adequate supply of volunteers.
It might also be suggested that a reasonable American legislature would remember and be swayed by a fact that has somehow been pushed from center stage in my analysis, namely, that
a life is at stake.110 This objection depends on a common assumption that preserving life is the highest value in our tradition. But
the assumption is either stated too broadly or simply wrong. The
equal protection argument I have made about abortion could not
be made were it not that in many other cases involving potential
samaritans our legal system prefers values such as non100. I shall explain in Section II.B. infra why I think we must accept the proposition
that a life is at stake for purposes of constitutionalargument about abortion laws.
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subordination and physical integrity to the value of preserving
life. It is simply not possible to claim that in our system preserving life takes precedence over everything else.
Finally, it might be suggested that a reasonable American
legislature would (or at least could) reject my argument at its
very first step, the step where I decide that securing an abortion
counts as an omission in the context of samaritan law. For purposes of constitutional analysis, viewing my entire argument
through the lens of the reasonable American legislature test, I
think this first step is the most problematic. It seems clear to me
that if we want to be faithful to the spirit of our law regarding
samaritanism, we must conclude that securing an abortion is
more an omission than an act. But, just because the degree of
deference due a contrary legislative judgment is not precisely
quantifiable, I am not completely comfortable asserting a proposition (which I do nonetheless assert) that is essential to my argument, namely the proposition that any reasonable American legislature would, on reflection, see this matter as I do.
I do not claim to have established beyond doubt that laws
against abortion deny equal protection. There are limits to how
far logic and analysis can carry us. If the ultimate test in the
equal protection area is whether a reasonable American legislature could have passed (or in some cases, could fail to repeal) a
particular law, then there comes a point at which the judgment
of persons imbued with and sensitive to our traditions is worth
more than hypotheticals and distinctions.
In effect, the Court in Roe decided that a reasonable American legislature could not have passed (or failed to repeal) most
state abortion laws. To be sure, the Justices did not explain themselves in this way. To my mind, they did not even explain as well
as they might have why abortion laws presented a hard constitutional question - why they were not obviously constitutional.
But I have tried to explain why abortion laws do present a hard
question. Against that background, the most important fact
about the decision in Roe is that seven Justices, including some
not known for their activist tendencies, were impelled to strike
down abortion laws even though they must have realized that
their arguments were not very persuasive. In this case, given the
nature of the issue, the fact that the Court held abortion laws
unconstitutional is evidence for the proposition that they are unconstitutional, even though the Constitution does not simply
mean what the Court says it means.
Of course, the Court's decision would be stronger evidence
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(to my mind) if the Court had cast its argument about why abortion was a hard question in the terms of this essay. If the Court
must exercise judgment, it is better that it exercise its judgment
on properly formulated questions. If the Court had decided there
was no general "right of privacy" and no right inferrable from the
Constitution to decide how many children to bear, and if it had
formulated the question in my equal protection terms, it is possible that it would have upheld abortion laws. If so, then the decision in Roe should be reconsidered. But my guess is that the
Justices would have answered my question the same way-they
answered their own. And my judgment is that they would have
been right. If one considers dispassionately the question, "Could
a reasonable American legislature, remembering the constitutionally protected interests impaired by abortion laws, focusing
on the inequality of treatment between some potential samaritans and others, and bearing in mind all the other considerations
we have mentioned, pass or fail to repeal a law forbidding
abortion?", I think the correct answer is "No."
There is one final matter to be dealt with. We have yet to
answer the "too far afield" objection, the claim that courts simply
should not entertain equal protection arguments which depend
on such far-ranging comparisons as that between abortion and
other samaritan problems. I can think of four possible arguments
against such far-ranging comparisons: (1) Allowing such comparisons expands vastly, and unacceptably, the number of laws subject to equal protection scrutiny. (2) Allowing such comparisons
raises issues too subjective and formless to be appropriate for
judicial decision. (3) Striking down a law on the basis of such a
comparison suggests implicitly a criticism of the legislature,
which criticism may be undeserved. If the comparison is too unusual, the legislature may not have been at fault in failing to take
it into account. (4) Inequalities that are revealed only by farreaching comparisons are unlikely to be resented in the same way
as traditional, immediately apparent inequalities. They therefore
do not impose the same social costs or call for as much judicial
solicitude.
These arguments are not without substance. They suggest
that a degree of circumspection may be appropriate where farreaching comparisons are suggested. But they do not, to my
mind, justify a general refusal to consider such comparisons. Nor
do they weigh strongly against considering the comparison I suggest in the abortion case.
As to the idea that far-ranging comparisons will cause new
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equal protection issues to spring up everywhere, it is a sufficient
answer that other aspects of the approach I suggest - the attention to tradition in defining specially protected interests and
specially disfavored classifications, and the general deference to
the legislature - will limit the number of problems which need
to be taken seriously and will limit results overturning legislative
choices. In the abortion case, as we have seen, two specially protected interests are impaired by an inequality of treatment involving a specially disfavored classification.
As to the idea that far-ranging comparisons give rise to questions that are too subjective, the answer is that every serious
equal protection problem eventually reduces to a question that is
subjective in the same sense. I say "subjective in the same sense"
advisedly, since the ultimate question is not "subjective" in the
strongest sense in which that term is commonly used. Ultimately,
every equal protection problem comes down to a question about
whether some law is or is not consistent with our legal tradition.
There is no mechanical way for a judge to answer such a question.
However, the conscientious judge who attempts to answer such a
question is doing something quite different from attempting to
decide whether the law before him comports with his own sense
of justice. Also, even if the ultimate question is subjective in some
significant sense, the example of this essay demonstrates (I hope)
that argument and analysis are important in identifying the precise contours and context of the ultimate decision about what our
tradition allows.
As to the suggestions that far-ranging comparisons will require the courts to consider inequalities which legislatures reasonably overlooked and which no citizen is troubled by, I think the
answer is that some far-ranging comparisons will have more force
than others. The comparison of the pregnant woman with the
potential samaritan is not yet a commonplace of legal or public
discussion of the abortion issue. But my experience is that most
people, once introduced to the comparison, see that it is a significant and troublesome comparison. It is easy to overlook, but it is
not easy to put aside as fanciful or irrelevant, once it is noticed.
Even if legislatures have not noticed this comparison, I suggest
that any reasonable American legislature would be persuaded by
the comparison to repeal abortion laws once the comparison was
brought to its attention. If that is so, then it is appropriate for
courts to strike down abortion laws on the basis of the comparison
without waiting for legislative reconsideration. No serious criticism of legislatures is implied.
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With regard to the claim that members of the public, or
women in particular, are not disturbed by this specific comparison, I have explained previously why many women's manifest
resentment of abortion laws is based on considerations closely
related to the equal protection argument of this essay, even if the
considerations have not been articulated in quite the same way.
In sum, whatever we may think of other arguments based on
far-ranging comparisons, the argument I have suggested against
abortion laws cannot be brushed aside on the ground that it
ranges too far afield.
B.

The Consequences of the Argument

In this final Section, I shall comment very briefly on why I
regard my argument as stronger than the Court's argument in
Roe and on what it would mean for other cases involving abortion
or "privacy" generally if'my argument were adopted.
The Court's argument in Roe posits a "right of privacy" that
is "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy".'"' The Court's argument has been
elaborated in the scholarly literature by Heymann and Barzelay,'12 who infer constitutional protection for the woman's interest
in having an abortion from a series of cases running from Meyer
v. Nebraska01 3 to Eisenstadt v. Baird.'"' According to Heymann
and Barzelay, these cases establish a "realm of private decision
as to matters of marriage, procreation and child rearing". 0 5 Unfortunately, as John Hart Ely has pointed out, the cases relied on
are a rag-tag lot.' 6 Most of them either claim to be or are best
understood as being primarily about something other than
"marriage, procreation and child-rearing". It is not clear that
they add up to anything at all, especially when one remembers
other cases in which colorable claims concerning marriage, procreation, or child-rearing have received short shrift.' 7
My argument, unlike the Court's, appeals to constitutional
values - non-subordination, freedom from physical invasion,
101. 410 U.S. at 153.
102. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 1.
103. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
104. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
105. Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 1, at 769.
106. Ely, supra note 73, at 931-32 n.79.
107. E.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (marriage, or actually divorce); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (procreation); Baker v. Owen, 423 U.S. 907 (1975),
summarily affg. 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (child-rearing).
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which are firmly established. I do not

claim that my argument generates the result in Roe by unassailable logical deduction from unimpeachable premises. Constitutional argument does not work that way. I do claim that my
argument is better grounded than the Court's in what are undeniably constitutional values.
The Court's argument not only relies on a right to make
decisions about "marriage, procreation and child rearing", but
it also relies heavily on what I have referred to as the post-partum
"family-planning" interests. In enumerating the costs to the
woman of being denied an abortion, the Court emphasizes costs
associated with actually raising the child.' 8 However, it is not
appropriate to couint all of these costs even in a "balancing"
process unless we are persuaded (as I am not) that the psychological cost to a woman of giving up a child for adoption is as great
as the cost of rearing an unwanted child. (We should remember
also that what is relevant is not the cost to a woman who wants
a child of being compelled to give it up once it is born, but rather
the cost of parting with the child for a woman who did not want
it in the first place. The woman may be ambivalent at all stages,
and being compelled to bear the child and then give it up, instead
of aborting it, may make the feelings of attachment to the child
harder to deny. Even so, this is an aspect of the problem where
remembering the relevant viewpoint, which is that of the mother
who does not want a child, seems to make the cost smaller rather
than greater.) My argument, as I have explained, does not rely
on these "family-planning" interests.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of my argument is that it
makes it possible to avoid the question of whether the fetus is,
or may be treated by the state as, a person. Justice Blackmun
claims at one point that the Court need not decide "when life
begins".' 9 But his general argument, which during the first two
trimesters prefers the woman's "right of privacy" over the state's
interest in protecting "potential life", seems plainly to assume
that the fetus is not a person until the point of viability (at the
earliest)."' Indeed, Blackmun elsewhere suggests that if the fetus
were a person within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment,
the woman's claim to an abortion would be foreclosed by the
108. 410 U.S. at 153.
109. 410 U.S. at 159.
110. See, e.g., 410 U.S. at 163.
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Constitution itself.'1 '
On the last point, I think Blackmun is mistaken. Even if the
fetus were a person for purposes of the fourteenth amendment, it
would not follow that abortion was forbidden by the Constitution
or that states were required by the Constitution to have laws
forbidding abortion. The people who need the assistance of potential samaritans in ordinary samaritan cases are persons under the
fourteenth amendment, and yet the general common law badsamaritan principle is not unconstitutional. (Similarly, the fact
that fourteenth amendment persons are killed does not vitiate the
ordinary law of self-defense.)
Although I think Blackmun is mistaken about what would
follow from a holding that the fetus is a person under the fourteenth amendment, I think he is right that the fetus is not a
person under the fourteenth amendment.12 That, however, is not
enough to justify his refusal to treat the fetus as a person for
purposes of weighing the interests affected by the Texas abortion
statute. The fourteenth amendment does not say that the fetus
is a person, but neither does the fourteenth amendment say that
a state may not decide to regard the fetus as a person, if the state
so chooses.
It is essential to Blackmun's argument that he brush aside
the state's attempt to regard the fetus as a person. As far as I can
see, there is no adequate constitutional justification for this
brushing aside. My argument, unlike Blackmun's, does not depend on refusing to allow the state to regard the fetus as a person.
Everything I have said is consistent with the assumption that the
fetus is a person. Other persons are allowed to die when potential
samaritans are authorized by the bad-samaritan principle to
deny aid. The personhood of the fetus, even if it be conceded, is
not an adequate reason (indeed it is no reason at all) for treating
the pregnant woman differently from other potential samaritans.
A similar but more general point in favor of my argument is
that it is not a "balancing" argument."' Even after the Court
decides that the fetus may not be treated by the state as a person
(during the first two trimesters), the Court must still balance the
woman's "right of privacy" against the state's interest in protecting potential human life. It is far from clear that this balance
favors the woman. Whether or not the cases from Meyer to
111. 410 U.S. at 156.57.
112. 410 U.S. at 158.
113. See pages 1589-90 supra.
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Eisenstadt establish a right of family-related freedom-of-choice,
none of those cases involves a state interest remotely like the
interest in protecting "potential" but already conceived human
life. Accordingly none of those cases establishes or even suggests
that the right of family-related freedom-of-choice is weighty
enough to overcome the state's interest in forbidding abortion.
My argument, on the other hand, does not require any such
balancing by the Court. I doubt that it is correct to regard the
bad-samaritan principle and the right of self-defense as based on
"balancing" at all, but even if they are, the balancing is already
done when those doctrines are accepted. Whether or not the interests in physical integrity and non-involvement "outweigh" the
interest in human life, our law leaves no doubt that they prevail
over it (and a fortiori over the interest in potential life) in the
relevant contexts.
Finally, my argument justifies more clearly than the Court's
argument the Court's conclusion that abortion may not be forbidden even in the third trimester when the life or health of the
mother is at stake."' If the problem is ultimately one of balancing, as the Court's opinion suggests, it is not clear why the state's
compelling interest (as the Court describes it) in protecting the
potential life of a fetus already capable of "meaningful life outside the mother's womb '"' 5 (in the Court's phrase) is outweighed
even by the woman's life, much less by her health. On my approach, however, the matter is clear. Even the reader who rejects
my general conclusions must admit that there is no other case in
which we would even consider requiring one individual to sacrifice his life or health to rescue another.
Since I have suggested that my argument provides a better
justification than the Court's for the result in Roe, it is worth
asking whether my argument justifies all of the result. In particular, does it justify drawing a line at the end of the second trimester, after which abortion may be generally forbidden? To be sure,
the burdens of pregnancy and delivery that will be avoided by an
abortion diminish as the pregnancy advances. Even so, an abortion by induced labor early in the third trimester would spare the
woman two months of advanced pregnancy plus the difference
between the pain and discomfort of a full-term delivery and the
lesser pain and discomfort of an easier, earlier-induced delivery.
114. 410 U.S. at 163-64.
115. 410 U.S. at 163.
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The burdens avoided by even a third-trimester abortion are distinctly greater than the burdens imposed by other exceptions to
the bad-samaritan principle.
I think the Court's line between the second and third trimesters can be justified on the ground that the woman who allows her
pregnancy to reach the third trimester without having an abortion (assumed to be permissible in the first two trimesters) has
waived her right of non-involvement with the fetus. Surely by the
end of the second trimester a woman has had knowledge of her
pregnancy long enough to have had a reasonable time to think
through the difficult issue of whether she wants an abortion.
There is a genuine state interest in encouraging decision at the
earliest reasonable opportunity, even if it is only the interest in
avoiding the greater dismay of many members of the public at
late abortions."'Admittedly, this argument does not tell us precisely where the "waiver" line should be. But if we consider the
possibilities for denial by the woman early in the pregnancy, the
difficulty of the issue for many women, and, on the other hand,
the desirability of some clear line so long as it is not too early, a
line at the beginning of the third trimester seems a reasonable
solution."

7

Since Roe, the Court has dealt with a number of subsidiary
issues involving abortion - procedural requirements," 8 parents'
consent requirements,"' husband's consent requirements,"" public funding,' and so on. With the possible exception of the cases
on public facilities and public funding, these cases largely involved state attempts to forbid abortion by indirection. Generally
speaking, my argument leads to the same results in these cases
116. The text may seem inconsistent with the earlier suggestion, made in discussing
the military draft, that there is no genuinely "public" interest in forbidding abortion. If
there is sufficient public interest to support a requirement that the woman decide whether
to have an abortion by a certain time, why may not the abortion be forbidden on the basis
of the same interest? A full answer to this question would require an extensive discussion
of constitutional "waiver" theory. I shall not give a full answer. The short answer is that
I think certain public interests may be enough to require an individual to make a decision
and stick by it even though those interests are not enough to compel a particular decision
and may not even count towards compelling a particular decision.
117. Actually, it seems to me that a reasonable American legislature could probably
put the "waiver" line somewhat earlier. But I cannot be sure of that without looking more
carefully than I have at the mechanics of arranging abortions for women in various circumstances.
118. E.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
119. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
120. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
121. E.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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that the Court has reached. To the extent that there is more to
these cases than mere striking down of attempts to avoid Roe, my
argument may explain the Court's results marginally better than
the Court's argument does.
For example, the step from saying the state may not forbid
an abortion when the woman and her husband both want it (or
when there is no husband in the picture) to saying the state may
not forbid an abortion when the woman wants it and her husband
does not is not quite so simple on Blackmun's approach as Blackmun claims.' 2 After all, if the whole issue is one of balancing,
might it not be that the state's interest, which is less than the
interest of the woman or of the woman and her husband together
when they are aligned, is greater than the difference between the
interests of the woman and her husband when they are opposed?
Indeed, given the weightiness of the state's interest and the similarity of the woman's interests to her husband's (especially while
the Court emphasizes the "family-planning" aspect rather than
the physical burdens of pregnancy), is it not quite likely? On my
approach, however, it is clear that the state can no more make
the unwilling woman serve the fetus and her husband than it can
make her serve the fetus alone.
As to the issue of parents' or judges' consent to abortion for
minors, this is a difficult problem. It is far from obvious that a
statute which was well calculated to encourage identification of
the minor's best interests (a statute, that is, which was not a mere
anti-abortion statute in disguise) would deserve to be struck
down. But again, if the Court is committed to striking down such
statutes (and this is much less certain after Belotti III3 than it
seemed before), the justification seems somewhat stronger on my
approach than on the Court's. The interests of the woman which
my approach makes central (interests in avoiding physical burdens) are more easily appreciated and weighed by a minor than
the comparatively abstract family-planning interests emphasized
by the Court.
With regard to the public facilities and public funding cases,
there is also little to choose between the Court's approach and
mine. I tend to think the Court decided these cases correctly,
though I shall not argue for that view here. My approach may
122. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976): "[Tjhe State
cannot delegate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion
[when the State alone may not prevent it]."
123. Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
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make the correctness of the decisions a bit clearer than the
Court's. The Court's approach more easily suggests a fundamental right of the woman to have an effective choice whereas my
approach emphasiies that what is objectionable is the state's
compelling the woman to serve the fetus, a compulsion which is
absent once abortion is no longer forbidden.
It is when we look at problems not involving the right to
abortion that the difference between my approach and the
Court's becomes striking. One noteworthy feature of my argument is that it is asymmetric. Unlike Blackmun's argument, it
provides no support for a right to bear children. I regard this as
an advantage. There may be a right of some sort to bear children,
but such a right does not find much support in the Meyer-toEisenstadt line of cases (aside from some quotable language here
and there). The right, if it exists, must be founded rather on the
sort of argument Harlan advanced in his Poe v. Ullman dissent,,"
and it must, I think, be an incident of marriage.
Looking beyond procreation, there is a considerable literature suggesting that a broad "right of privacy" was established
in Roe. The Court's language certainly encouraged this belief. Yet
litigants who have tried to persuade the Supreme Court to implement the right of privacy outside the abortion area have
generally been disappointed. Consider Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney, '2 in which the Court summarily affirmed a decision
upholding Virginia's sodomy statute. It is far from obvious why
something called the "right of privacy", which encompasses the
right to bring about the death of a fetus in a clinic serving the
public, should not encompass the right of consenting adults to
engage in the nonviolent sexual behavior of their choice in private. It is obvious, however, that my argument in support of Roe,
based on the bad-samaritan principle or the self-defense analogy,
says nothing at all about the right to engage in homosexual (or
heterosexual) relations. The argument I suggest in justification of
Roe is much more closely tied to the specific problem of abortion
than is the Court's argument. My argument therefore seems more
in line with the Court's later decisions in the "privacy" area.

ENvoi
If I had been writing an essay about moral philosophy instead
124. 367 U.S. 497, 539-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
125. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), summarily affg. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
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of about constitutional law, I would have made the argument in
favor of abortion turn centrally on the proposition that a fetus is
not a person. I would not have relied on the proposition that there
is no general duty to aid a person in serious danger even when one
can do so at trivial cost to oneself. I would not have appealed to
any notion that corporal punishment is impermissible, nor indeed
would I have given the same negative weight to physical invasions
generally that I do in the present essay. I would not have claimed
that there is a right to kill an innocent rapist. However, I have
not been writing about moral philosophy. I have been writing
about American constitutional law. For reasons I cannot explain
here, I think the projects are quite different.
Sometimes the argument of this essay seems to me an adequate constitutional justification of the result in Roe. Sometimes
it does not. (My principal nagging doubt is about the very first
step of the argument, when viewed from the constitutional
perspective. I think the general thrust of samaritan law requires
that securing an abortion be treated as an omission in that context. Indeed, I have no doubt on that point. But might not a
reasonable American legislature simply disagree?) Adequate or
not, the argument I have presented almost always seems to me
the best justification of the result in Roe that I know of.
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